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TARIQ RAIS 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
The United States policy towards the West Asia is 
generally guided due to the presence of oil reserves and 
their strategic locations etc. U.S. Strategic interests in 
the region began to grow in the wake of World 
War II. Since then she maintains very-very strategic 
relations with Israel as almost from the birth of Israel/ 
the successive U.S. administrations have provided all kinds 
of assistance; Political, Economic and Military to Israel. 
Moreover, U.S. recognition of the State of Israel on 
15th May 1948 acquired a great symbolic importance. Since 
then, U.S. has been supporting Israel on almost every issues 
of crucial interest to the Jewish State. During 1960"s, 
America sought to maintain regional stability through a 
balance of power in the area and treated Israel as a 
military proxy. Under the Kennedy and Johnson adminis-
trations the U.S. became a significant arms supplier to the 
State of Israel. 
After the collapse of Iran as an U.S. ally in the 
West Asia, Israel became the single U.S. defence partner in 
the region. Being the only reliable friend of United 
States, Israel possesses the most sophisticated arms in the 
region. Another reason which led to the special relations 
iV 
between United States and Israel is the shared democratic 
traditions and values. Despite all the burdens like 
ocoMomic, millLaiy, cultural and political, large numbers of 
American people in and out of the Government think that 
Israel can still serve as a useful ally for the United 
States. 
The present study, '^ U. S.- Israel Strategic Colln-
boration" is divided into four chapters including 
conclusion. First chapter of the study deals with U.S. 
policy towards VJest Asia, especially towards Israel. The 
important factor for U.S. presence in the region is to 
support and ensure the existence of Israel as its closest 
ally. Another American interest in this region is the 
strategic importance of Petroleum and its by- products as 
foundations of the ability to fight a modern war. In this 
region U.S. in playing a important mediatory role in several 
peace accords, treaties and criseses like Camp David accord, 
Israel- Palestine Peace accord, Israeli-Jordanian accord and 
Suez Canal crisis, treaty of CEIJTO etc. Second Chapter of 
the study deals with the Israel's National Security 
doctrine. Security is the central problem of the Israel's 
existence, from the beginning of the State, the Israel's 
thinking has been clear about the importance of security and 
contrality. United States is deeply involved in Israel's 
security doctrine since the birth of Israel. U.S. Provide 
her a lot of arms and ammunitions and financial aids. The 
Third Chapter of study deals with the 'U.S. - Israeli 
military co-operation' for defence and strategic reasons. 
Israel's geographic location, along with its military 
facilities, offers the United States a good base if inter-
vention in the Arabian Peninsula be necessary. United 
States arms supply to Israel to a large extent from time to 
time is for the security and survival of Israel. During 
the all Arab- Israeli Wars, United States extented a signi-
ficant amount of arms and ammunitions to Israel both on 
grants and sales basis. Fourth Chapter covers the West 
Asian Peace Processes. In this region many peace plans and 
proposals came from various persons. In every peace 
proposal, U.S. took active part and slove some. Many U.S. 
Secretaries proposed peace plan in West Asian region to 
solve the Arab- Israeli hostilities, but some plans were 
rejected by Arabs and some by the Israelies. The Middle 
East has been witness to a large number of peace proposals. 
This chapter take a survey of some of the importants 
proposals keeping in view the US perception of peace. 
CHAPTER - I 
AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS WEST ASIA: AN OVERVIEW 
1.1 U.S. Policy Towards Establishment of Israel; 
Israel came into existence on 15th May 1948 as a 
result of the partition of Palestine into separate Jewish 
and Arab States. The partition was recommended by a United 
Nations special commission on Palestine. The Arab State did 
not reconcile to the birth of Israel. While till the second 
World War Palestine was considered by the United States as 
an area of British interests, it became, after the end of 
that war an area of American interests because of its 
location. Almost from the birth of the State of Israel, 
successive administrations in Washington became interested 
in the survival and security of Israel. While Numerous 
State Department Officials including such men as Secretary 
of State John F. Dulles gave expression to that thought. 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was more forthright on 
this issue while testifying before the House Committee on 
International Relations on 8th September 1975. 
Whereas in the late 'forties and early 'fifties the 
United States was less willing to get involved in the West 
Asian complications, it became more actively involved in it 
from the middle of the 'fifties. The idea of Jewish State 
elicited sympathy in the United States due to the terrible 
sufferings of the Jewish community in Germany during the 
Hitlerite regime. There was a very strong, prosperous and 
powerful Jewish community in the United States, and it was 
concentrated in important American cities such as New 
York, Chicago, Philadelphia and Los Angeles, and its votes 
at times influenced the outcome of the congressional and 
presidential elections. Jews had been important financial 
contributors to the election campaigns of those candidates 
who favoured their cause. Thus, it was no surprise that 
President Harry S. Truman, facing a tough election 
campaign, sought to strengthen his political prospects by 
according prompt recognition to Israel on its creation in 
1948. 
The American Jewish Community felt a deep sense of 
identification with Israel. It provided significant 
financial aid to Israel. According to N^dav Safran of 
Harvard University, Israel received about $200 million 
2 during the year in which it struggled for its birth. This 
was the beginning of what amounted to massive support in 
later years. Israeli Educational, Cultural, Scientific and 
Philantropie institutions received regular assistance from 
the American Jews. Israel became an important tourist 
centre for them. The visitors not only spent money that was 
helpful in the economic development of the country but also 
brought to the people of Israel an awareness of the ties 
that existed between the two countries. 
Washington claimed to feel a strong sympathy for 
Israel as a democratic nation and a society imbued with the 
"libertarian values and humantic culture" of the west and 
often justified aid to Israel on that basis. Although the 
United States associated itself with and supported many 
non-democratic and anti-Israeli regime in the West Asian and 
Gulf region out of strategic and economic considerations, 
it viewed Israel as warranting 'Special' consideration. 
John F. Scott, Political-Military Officer in the State 
Department's Office of Israel and Arab-Israeli Affairs, told 
the present writer in 1980 that the United States supported 
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Israel because it was a dependable ally. The US could, he 
said, depend on its military co-operation in various ways. 
He indicated further that it was politically advantageous 
for any administration to ensure Jewish support for a policy 
of aid to Israel. 
The existed in the United States a very Powerful 
Jewish Lobby. There were at least seventy-five identifible 
groups-Jewish and non-Jewish - which actively supported 
the actions . and policy positions of the Israel's 
Government. The Pro-Israeli Lobby utilized a complex of 
devices ranging from knowledge of how to make maximum use of 
the American press to political pressure through congress. 
According to a State Department Official, "....they are 
articulate, they are organized, they are terribly public 
relation oriented and they are Smart". 
US-Israeli linkage dates back to American support to 
the Palestine mandate through the Anglo-British convention 
of 1924, for exploring the possibility of establishing a 
•national home for the Jew's in Palestine. But in view of 
rising Arab outrage against the Balfour Declaration (1917) 
and American involvement with the oil consortium (IPC) in 
1928 and its access to Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti oil 
resources in the thirties made it slightly lukewarm towards 
its early commitment with the Zionist. 
The oil lobby in the United 'states (1940-43) 
impressed upon the Government that its commitment to protect 
the oil producing areas and regimes much mere valuable than 
the protection of Zionist interests. But the significance 
of the Jewish vote in the Presidential elections could not 
be undermined either. The 5 million (in 1945) strong 
American Jewish Community constituted a formidable Zionist 
lobby in America which no Government could possibly afford 
to ignore. 
In August 1945, President Truman urged the British 
Government to admit 100,000 Jews into Palestine in order to 
give relief to European Jewish refugees. Later the United 
States devoted all its energy and pressure to secure a 
two-thirds majority in the UN General Assembly for the 
partition of Palestine. When the State of Israel came into 
being on 14th May 1948, President Truman immediately 
recognized it. 
The Palestine policy of the United States gave a 
jolt to its prestige in the Arab World Community on the 
influence of American Jewry over the foreign policy 
decisions of the American Government, the Defence Secretary, 
James foresstal observed in 1948: "I thought it a most 
disastrous and regrettable fact that foreign policy of this 
country was determined by the contributions a particular 
7 bloc of interests might make to the party funds." 
The US commitement to the Zionist aroused widespread 
resentment in the Arab capitals and many oil states 
threatened to cut off oil exports to the countries which 
supported Israel. But the attitute of US government was 
emboldened by the Private assurances given by King Saud that 
his country would not allow the Arab States to take any 
action detrimental to American oil interests. The Saudis 
really obstructed the Arab Plans to impose oil embargo 
against the West in 1948 and they stuck to that attitude in 
1956 and even in 1967. 
The 1967 Arab Israel War which resulted in a 
humiliating defeat of Arab frontline States as huge 
territories in Syria, Jordan and Egypt fell under Israeli 
occupation, generated the anti-American Sentiment. In the 
aftermaths of war, almost the entire politcally expressive 
Arab World opted for a pro-Soviet Orientation. With the 
Soviet exacerbation of the Arab Israeli conflict, the US 
found itself is an increasingly complex and difficult 
position in the Arab World. It become not only associated 
with attempts at undermining the national sovereignty of the 
West Asian State but also identified with the adversary of 
the entire Arab World-Israel. With Saudi Arabia isolated in 
the Arab World (owing to its Pro-American Policy during the 
v^ ar and after) and rest of the Arab World written of to 
Russia, the Pro-Arab Lobby in America got overpowered by the 
Pro-Israel Lobby and since the June 1967 War Israel came to 
be regarded along with Iran and Saudi Arabia as a most 
important pillar of the US Power in West Asia. 
The Yom Kippur war between Israel and the Arab 
States in 1973 led to a dramatic expansion of American 
influence in the Arab World and the Gulf region, with a 
radical change in the Egyptian Policy under President Anwar 
Sadat (which turned totally Pro-American) the US could now 
rely in West Asia on both Israel and Egypt. 
The a l l i a n c e with I s rae l i s not f ree from s t resses 
and s t ra ins for the United States as i t imposes a continuous 
Q 
burden on its relations with the Arab World. The Camp 
David agreement was aimed at showing that Peace between 
Israel and a major Arab country is possible but Egypt's 
subsequent isolation in the Arab World and Israel's 
unwillingness to return the occupied territories turned the 
entire exercise futile. However, the partial gains of the 
Camp David cannot be denied. 
Since Reagan's coming to power, the American policy 
has turned more and more Pro-Israeli. Israel's almost 
fanatical obsessions with its security and American Jewry's 
capability in drawing increasing commitment from the US 
Government in Israel's favour has resulted in a massive 
militarization of the 'Zionist State'. The Reagan Adninis-
tration instead of focusing on peaceful solution of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict as a number one priority in West Asia, 
is concentrating on countring the Soviet threat, which does 
not exist exactly in that proportion in which it is tired 
to be countered. The massive (almost out of proportion) 
arms transfer to Israel is causing frictions in US 
relations with other regional climants for military 
superiority, particularly Saudi Arabia. Sheikh Ahmad 
Yamani, the Saudi Minister for Petroleum commenting on the 
US Policy of militarizing Israel warned: 'To the Saudis, 
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there are only two threats in this World-International 
Communism and Israel. The first helps to reinforce our 
friendship with America, while the second is a threat to 
that friendship. The more support the US gives to Israel, 
the better is the climate for Russians in the region, 
Israel is the opening through which the Russian slip into 
9 
the Arab World." Highlighting the real problem Iraq's 
President, Saddam Hussain concurred: "The American credi-
bility in the Arab World depends not so much on how much 
military muscle the US can flex as on how much political 
clout it can bring to bear in the Arab-Israeli stand off. 
The US inability to budge the Israelis from the West Bank 
and to mediate a settlement of the Palestinian issue has 
direct and damaging consequences for American effort to 
shore up the Gulf Security." 
The militarization of Israel has created a complex 
web of intricate problems for the United States but it seems 
that it is running the risk of inviting Arab disillusionment 
in the hope that so long the American oil interests in Saudi 
Arabia remain linked up with the survival of the Saudi 
regime, any threat to the West's oil interests could be 
countered with ease. And for the greater menace - the 
Soviet threat - militarization of the America's allies is 
12 
seen as the best answer. 
1.2 Suez Crisis and the Role of US; 
US Policy in the Suez crisis was largely dominated 
by the effort to resolve the dispute by peaceful means and 
prevent resort to force. That objective reflected various 
considerations, but a major factor was Eisenhower's strong 
commitment to the U.N. Charter obligations against resort to 
force. The President took an active role in handling the 
crisis and in setting the policy line. As always, he worked 
closely with Dulles and depended heavily on him for managing 
the tactis and negotiations. Apparently, there were no 
significant differences in approach to the issues; yet the 
President was clearly in charge. Indeed, he was largely on 
his own for the first several days of the crisis when Dulles 
was absent in Latin America, and later in the critical UN 
phase after 3 November when Dulles was in hospital. Within 
the State Department, the person who worked most closely 
with Dulles in handling the crisis was Herman Phelger, the 
legal adviser of the Department. 
The divergences between the United States and 
Britain and France emerged almost at once. They differed 
greatly in their appraisals of the issues, the objectives, 
and the appropriate means. For this, there were many 
reasons. Unlike Britain and France, the United States had 
not been intimately involved with the Middle East over a 
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long period. Even after the second world war, the US had at 
first tended to follow the British lead. And when action 
was required, the US sought to act jointly with Britain and 
France, as in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, adopted 
after the Arab-Israeli hostilities to preserve peace and 
restrain arms competition in the area. But, more and more, 
events forced the US to define its own course. 
Even so, U.S. concern with the Middle East was 
mainly derivative. Its direct interests were more limited 
than those of its allies. While US shipping was a large 
canal user and US business had oil concessions, neither was 
crucial for the United States economy. Less directly, the 
US had substantial interests of several kinds. Since its 
European allies depended so heavily on the canal and the 
oil, there reliable access to both became an important 
interest for the US and the security of Turkey, Iran and the 
region as a whole was related to the US containment policy, 
and was thought to require at least some Middle East 
Participation, if only provide greater depth of defence. 
Neverthless, relation with Nasser Steadily deteriorated. 
During 1955, his harshest blow to US policy was the Soviet 
Arms deal: at one stroke that brought the USSR into the 
Middle East, linked the major Arab State to the Soviet bloc, 
and upset the arms balance between Israel and the Arabs. 
So, the US continued to compete for Egyptian allegiance by 
u 
not selling matching arms to Israel, and by the joint offer 
(with the U.K. and I.B.R.D.) to help Egypt finance the Aswan 
Dam. By spring 1956,' however, readiness to placate Nasser 
had been chilled by his insistent anti-Western actions. In 
withdrawing the Aswan offer in mid-July, the US stressed 
that Egypt's arms commitments had mortgaged its national 
income so heavily as to leave inadequate resources for the 
dam project. Besides, the US Congress was hostile towards 
aid to Egypt, and Dulles was also concerned lest allies 
should conclude that blackmail paid better than cooperation. 
Thus, the US had lost hope of good relations with Nasser 
even before he nationalized the canal company. The British 
and France reaction to Nasser's move forced the US to decide 
quickly on its objectives in handling the crisis and on 
suitable means for achieving them. Even more explicit were 
the cables from Robert Murphy, whom the President had sent 
at once to London. As Murphy recalled, I was left in no 
doubt [by Macmillan] that the British Government believed 
that Suez was a test which could be met only by the use of 
force'. Macmillan later quoted and confirmed this 
impression, adding 'I made it quite clear that we and France 
must accept the challenge, or sink into the rank of second-
class nations'. Indeed, Eisenhower's letter of 31 July to 
Eden was prompted by 'the messages' communicated to me 
through Murphy from you and Harold Macmillian, telling me on 
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a most secret basis of your decision to employ force without 
delay or attempting any intermediate or less drastic steps'. 
Macmillian's own conviction was that 'neither [Dulles] nor 
Eisenhower could ever have been under any misapprehension. 
Britain and France in the long run would not shrink from 
force'. The French Government, Eisenhower wrote later, 
'took an even more emotional view than the British', 
comparing Nasser's action to the 'Seizure of the Rhimeland 
13 by Hilter two decades earlier. Eisenhower and Dulles took 
issue with the British and French on both their analysis and 
their aims. Their position, as Eisenhower understood it, 
was (1) that Nasser 'had unilaterally flouted a solemn 
treaty'; (2) that Egypt could not operate the canal 
efficiently and would not comply with the 1888 convention; 
(3) the success would so enhance Nasser's influence as 
essentially to make him 'an Arab dictator controlling the 
Mediterranean' (which Eisenhower 'suspected was the over-
riding' factor). 
While recognizing the disastrous consequences of 
'any closing of the canal', Eisenhower believed that this 
analysis was over-drawn. According to him, the United 
States differed profoundly, with its allies on each count. 
(1) It 'doubted, the validity of [their] their legal 
position' on the seizure and on resort to force. Although 
the canal was 'a utility essential to global welfare', the 
13 
'inherent right' of Egypt to nationalize it' could scarcely 
be doubled'. (2) The main issue, therefore, was whether or 
not Nasser would operate it in conformity with the 
convention of 1888. That could only be determined by 
experience. On the basis of his Panama service, Eisenhower 
questioned the view that Egypt could not operate the canal 
efficiently. (3) The UK and France were grossly 
exaggerating the broader threat of Nasser, especially in 
compairing him to Hitler. Any resort to force, as the case 
than stood, would not be warranted or sensible. It would 
weaken, and perhaps even destroy, the United Nations. Force 
should be considered, if at all, only after every resource 
14 for a peaceful settlement had been exhausted. 
Starting on 31st July, by letter and through Dulles 
and the Press, Eisenhower sought to persuade the British and 
French on two key points: to restrict their objective to 
ensuring the reliable functioning of the canal, without 
trying to depose Nasser; and to refrain from resort to 
force. As he pur it to Eden: 
" We have two problems, the first of which is the 
assurance of permanent and efficient operation on the Suez 
canal with justice for all concerned. The second is to see 
that Nasser shall not grow as a menace to the peace and 
vital interests of the West. In my view, these two problems 
need not and possibly cannot be solved simultaneously and by 
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the same methods, although we are exploring further means to 
this end. The first is the most important for the moment 
and must be solved in such a way as not to make the second 
more difficult. Above all, there must be no grounds for our 
several peoples to believe that anyone is using the canal 
difficulty as an excuse to proceed forcibly against Nasser. 
And we have friends in the Middle East who tell us they 
would like to see Nasser's deflation brought about. But 
they seem unanimous in feeling that the Suez is not the 
"15 issue on which to attempt to do this by force. 
His reasons for opposing force included the 
following: " failure to exhaust peaceful means in confoi^mity 
with the U.N. Charter would outrage public opinion in the 
United States and elsewhere; use of force would revive 
memories of imperialism and colonialism, offending many 
newer nations, and would drive the Arabs, including those 
hostile to Nasser, to unite behind him; it would risk 
closing the canal and becoming bogged down in guerrilla 
warfare; it would facilitate Soviet penetration of the 
Middle East as a supporter of Arab independence; and it 
would create a precedent for resorting to force to solve 
15a 
other problems, as in Korea, Taiwan and elsewhere. 
Accordingly, any use of force was conceivable only under 
extreme circumstances', which would not arise if Egypt 
could operate the canal, and if it complied with the 1888 
^. "16 
convention. 
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Capitulation to Nasser would also be unsound, in the 
President's view. A unified front by those dependent on the 
canal should succeed in inducing a satisfactory solution 
peacefully. There were many means of pressure, including 
user cooperation, economic measures, exploitation of Arab 
rivalries, and development of newer tankers and pipelines. 
'Even though this procedure may fail to give the set-back to 
Nasser that he so much deserves, we can better retrieve our 
position subsequently that if military force were hastily 
17 invoked. Since this approach clashed with that of Britain 
and France, the US task was both complex and delicate to 
frustrate resort to force by Britain and France without a 
split, and to resolve the canal issue peacefully. 
In defining its legal position, the U.S. also had to 
follow a narrow path. The starting point was the UN 
obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means 'in confor-
mity with the principles of justice and international law' 
and to refrain from'the threat or use of force' contrary to 
the UN purposes. In the initial phase, however, the US did 
not want to involve the UN in the crisis. In his press 
conference of 8 August, President Eisenhower said that it 
would be better in the early stages of the crisis to get the 
interested parties together to work out a settlement (in 
keeping with Article 33 of the Charter), especially since 
action in the United Nations would be impeded by the 
16 
18 Security Council veto. The U.S. did not want to see the 
UN dragged into the crisis prematurely and be unable to 
resolve it. Dulles considered the United Nations as an 
arbiter of last resort, to be used only if the interested 
parties proved incapable of resolving the problem. He did, 
however, envision the UN as fulfilling a supervisory role in 
the eventual settlement. 
The main difficulty was to devise a 'theory of the 
case' against Nasser. Eisenhower and Dulles fully under-
stood the distrust of Nasser by the U.k., France, and other 
users, and their desire to assure efficient and fair 
operation of the canal by safeguards more solid than 
Nasser's promise to comply with the 1888 convention. Yet 
it was hard to fault the nationalization as such, 
especially since fair compensation seemed to be tendered. 
Moreover, any demand to restore the canal to the company 
would have been unwise politically, and in any case, would 
only have put off the problem until the concession expired 
in 1968. 
Another obvious approach was to claim that user 
dependence on the canal made it an international public 
utility which the world community was entitled to regulate. 
The United States was deterred from adopting this theory by 
its interests in the Panama canal. For the U.S. that canal 
had a strategic importance rather different from the Suez 
17 
Canal's importance for Egypt. Since the U.S. was not 
prepared to accept international operation or control of 
Panama, it could not rely on a general claim of global 
interest in Suez. Hence the U.S. had to base the Suez case 
on the treaties specific to Suez, taking the tenuous line 
that the treaty status of Panama was wholly different. 
In consequence, Dulles sought to show that the 
convention of 1888 (as its Preamble said) had 'completed the 
system' for the Suez canal regime, which rested partly on 
the concession and operation by the canal company. But this 
argument had an obvious and substantial weakness. The 
convention doubtless assumed the existence of the concession 
until 1968; yet it expressly provided that the expiaration 
of the concession should not effect the continuance of the 
convention. In pxactical terms, however, there was a 
difference. As 1968 approached, users would either have 
been able to negotiate some further safeguards for reliable 
operation of the canal, or would have had time to adjust 
their patterns of shipping and trade. The abruptness of the 
take over denied the users these alternatives and under-
mined confidence. But if abrupt termination was a viola-
tion of the convention, that was a rather flimsy ground to 
justify international operation. 
18 
Strategic and Economic Importance 
of the Suez Canal; 
On the eve of World War II the whole hinterland of 
the Suez Canal (if we can use this term for the whole vast 
area in the South and than beyond in the East of the 
Canal), the two wings of the oanal (West Asia and North 
Africa), and the front flank of the canal (if we can use 
this term for the whole of the Mediterranean) occupied an 
important place in the offensive and defensive strategy of 
both the Axis and the Allied Powers. Both the Powers 
considered that the controle of the Middle East and the 
Mediterranean sea would yield positive results in other 
theatres of the war. there were strategic and economic 
factors behind it. 
(1) Strategic Important; The whole region, because of its 
locations, formed a bridge between Asia, Africa and Europe, 
through which a number of invaders had marched. It had 
served as both a highway of trade and a passage for 
conquest, and for both reasons, the countries of Europe 
involved in the region. The opening of the Suez Canal in 
1869, the strategic use of Middle East during World War I, 
and the opening of the circumstances global air routes after 
World War I further revealed and enhanced the importance of 
this region. The command of the region carried with it the 
19 
power of keeping open or closing the direct routes between 
1 9 the East and the West. The experiences of World War I 
clearly demonstrated the Strategic importance of the region 
in terms of the World conflict. 
(2) Economic Importance; Further the Middle East and the 
Mediterranean region gained a new importance of its own. 
The development of oil industry in the Middle East and the 
increasing dependence of Europe on oil enhanced the 
importance of the region. The constant and uninterrupted 
flow of oil became the prime need of the European countries 
for the industrial development, transportation and 
20 defence. For the constant routes became important. 
Obviously, the Mediterranean - Red sea route gained impor^  
tance both for the flow of oil and the raw materials coming 
from the East of Suez. 
Geographically the Mediterranean has three 
strategic outlets - Gibrattar to the Atlantic ocean, the 
Dardenelles to the black sea and the Suez canal to the 
Indian Ocean via the Red Sea. Of these three outlets the 
Suez canal ranks strategically very high as it is the only 
possible shorter route between the East and the West. In 
these circumstances strategy dictated that the mediterranean 
21 Suez trunk high way is controlled at the time of crisis. 
Consequently the Strategic and Economic interests of the 
European countries made the mediterranean and the Middle 
East a theatre of Supreme Strategic importance on the eve of 
World War II. 
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1.3 US & 1967 + 1973 Wars; 
The status-quo remained uneasy since the Suez crisis 
ended on 5th June 1967. In early 1967, Nasser asked United 
Nations Secretary-General U. Thant to remove the United 
Nations Emergency Force which had separated Israeli and 
Egyptian forces along the international boundry even since 
1956. Nasser then closed the straits of Tiran at Sharm 
el-Shiek, a move which denied Israel access to the Red Sea. 
This action of Nasser brought on him the 'Six Day War'. 
With UN troops withdrawn from the Egyptian-Israeli border, 
22 the situation changed drastically. Ihe Egyptian 
troops replaced the UN force. Israel thereupon struck a 
preemptive blow. The American perception, as Kissinger put 
it, was that once the Egyptian army replaced the UN force on 
its frontier, Israel had no choice but to mobilize its own 
armed forces because Israel's territory was toe small to 
absorb a first blow. And once Israel mobilized, its 
decision to fight had to be made within a week for 
its economy could not stand the indefinite loss of manpower 
absorbed by the mobilization and it could not demobilize 
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with the Egyptian army on its borders, he added. Israel 
inflicted heavy losses on the Egyptian air force in a 
surprise attack on the morning of 5th June. The Arab 
armies, equipped with Soviet weaponry, failed to perform 
adequately. Both the super powers rushed arms to their 
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respective clients. At one stage the Soviet Union threa-
tened "Punitive action" against Israel if the latter did not 
come to terms and stop fighting. A detailed study of the 
Six Day War is beyond the scope of the present study. 
The war ended with the Arab military defeat. The 
Israeli military forces numbering about 2,70,000 regulars 
and reservists worsen the combined forces of Egypt, Syria 
and Jordan. The balance of power in the Middle East shifted 
O A 
in Israel's favour. It succeeded in occupying Arab terri-
tories in Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank of river 
Jordan and Golan Heights. These areas were of great 
25 
strategic importance for the Israelis. Israel gained 
control for the first time of the city of Jerusalem and 
the sacred "Wailing Wall". The Israeli vowed that they 
would never give up Jerusalem, claiming that it was the 
historic seat of the Jewish People. 
Israel, by occupying the entire 2,000 square mile 
Sinai Peninsula, could improve its strategic position 
vis-a-vis Egypt. The Israeli forces, by occupying the Sharm 
al-Sheikh sector of Sinai on the Red Sea, could control 
the entrance to the disputed Gulf of Aqaba and were in a 
position to guarantee Israeli passage through the straits of 
Tiran to their increasingly important port of Elath. The 
area was a source of oil also. Thus, as Kissinger put it, 
'Israel '....Saw in the territories occupied in 1967 as 
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assurance of the security that it had vainly sought through-
27 
out its existence." The new territories seized by the 
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Israeli were three times the size of Israel itself. 
During the Six Day War, the Arab states lost much of 
the military equipment they had obtained from the Soviet 
Union. As the war ended, a new list of armaments to be 
obtained by Egypt and Syria from the Kremlin was ready. 
Israel, in turn, looked towards Washington for replenish-
ments. During the course of the war, also there was demand 
from many Americans to Tel Aviv. The American Jews and 
other sections of American population interested in the 
security of Israel collected massive donations for Israel. 
The Six Day War wrought noticeable changes in the 
American sales policy towards Israel. The Johnson Adminis-
tration decided to supply Israel sophisticated warplanes and 
other arms. Its arms supply policy wis considerably 
influenced by the Russian supplies of military materials to 
the Arab States. Even though the outcome of the war removed 
the "underdog" image that Israel had exploited to influence 
the American opinion, Washington formulated and enhanced 
arms supply programme to Israel on the ground of deterring 
what it described as the "growing Soviet activity in the 
region." Thus was born the argument that held the field in 
Washington upto the present namely, that the U.S. should 
help Israel to maintain a military edge over the potential 
radical Arab adversaries. 
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The Johnson Administration sought to convince the 
Kremlin that its (Kremlins) arms supplies to the Arabs would 
be countered by American arms shipments to the Jewish 
State. In January 1968, Prime Minister of Israel Levi 
Eshkol visited the United States and requested the 
authorities to supply Phantom Jets and additional Skyhawk 
planes. On 27 October of that year the State Department 
announced the completion of an agreement with Tel Aviv for 
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the sale of 50 Phantom F 4 Jets to Israel. The Arab 
States protested against the sale, but the Johnson Adminis-
tration remained firm. 
This firmness was due to the fact that the US 
relations with the Arab countries had suffered a tremendous 
strain. Seven Arab States - Algeria, Sudan, Syria, the 
United Arab Republic, Yemen and Southern Yemen - severed 
diplomatic relations with the United States. They did so 
because they had thought of using this as a weapon to bring 
about a change in the U.S. policy about a change in the U.S. 
policy of military aid to Israel. But it had no effect 
because the policy makers in Washington were reasonably 
confident that those who had broken off diplomatic relations 
were unlikely to take any concerted action that might either 
threaten US interests or pose a threat to Israel's survival. 
By the last days of the Johnson's Presidency, the United 
States became the chief supplier of military hardware to 
Israel. 
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The Six Day War of 1967 and subsequent arms supplies 
to the Arabs and the Israelis by the super-powers continued 
to inflame the situation. The Arab States in spite of heavy 
losses and humiliation, were bent upon recovering the lost 
territories. There cause was just, but their capacity for 
united action fell short of their shetorie. 
Arab guerrilla attacks on Israel continued, and 
these were highlighted in the American media while Israeli 
reprisals were generally characterized as defensive or as 
responses to give provocations. Congressman Hamilton Fish 
Jr. of New York asserted that from 6th June 1967 to 31st 
December 1968, about 1,288 acts of Sobotage and border 
incidents occurred in which Israel suffered 282 killed and 
1,095 wounded.^° 
1.4 U.S. a Camp David Agreement; 
One of the most important interests of the United 
States has been to secure free access to West Asian oil. 
Since the time when its allies. Western Europe and Japan, 
started depending on Gulf oil for their industrial viability 
and economic prosperity, maintenance of free flow of oil 
from West Asia became even more vitally important for the 
maintenance of American global dominance. To ensure 
uninterrupted flow of oil the stability of the region was of 
prime importance. The United States assumed that threat to 
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the stability of the region arises primarily from the Soviet 
Union and the radical regimes allied to it, which are 
interested in expanding their power in the region. 
A new dimension to US Policy in West Asia was added 
when Israel came into existence. Prompted by a powerful 
Jewish lobby at home, the US Government sustained and 
supported Israel. Without the sophisticated weapons and the 
generous economic assistance provided by the United States, 
Israel would not have been able to survive against its 
enemies. The US commitment to Israel has been honoured by 
seven American administrations in the past and has never 
been repuriated. The U.S. thus finds itself torn between 
its economic, political and strategic interests in the Arab 
States of the region and its commitment to Israel. Sc long 
as the Arab Israeli conflict continues^the US cannot hope to 
maximise its interests in the region. Resolution to the 
conflict would end the dilemma of the United States. The 
problem before the United States is that any appropriate 
response on its parts to the problems of the region is 
inextricably mixed with its relationship of cooperation, 
competition, and conflict with the Soviet Union. The US 
divides the states of the region from this prespective into 
moderates and radicals. Moderates are those which have 
regimes friendly to the West, particularly to the US. They 
are also more conservative in their domestic orientation 
26 
and, more importantly, they are opposed to any Soviet 
influence in the region. In contrast, radical states are 
friendly to the Soviet Union, receive Societ economic and 
military aid and are opposed to the United States. But such 
is the impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict that the United 
States finds moderate States like Saudi Arabia and Jordan 
joining hands with radical States like Syria and Iraq in 
their opposition to Israel. And yet the distinction between 
the moderates and radical States in the Middle East remains 
central to the US Policy. 
The Arab-Israeli War of 1967 had a profound impact 
on West Asia. At the end of the six days' war Israel was in 
occupation of Sinai, the West Bank, the Golan Heights and 
Eastern Jerusalum. The Arab State sought the withdrawl of 
Israel from their occupied territory, but the latter refused 
to withdraw, insisting that they must first recognize its 
right to exist. Even the 1993 War did not change the 
existing situation. Soon after the 1967 war, at the 
Khartoum Summit, the participating Arab States unanimously 
decided that they would not recognize Israel, nor negotiate 
with it, nor conclude peace with it. The question that 
remained was now to secure the withdrawl of Israel from the 
Arab territory. 
After the termination of hostilities, the stage was 
set for an effort to achieve settlement. The American 
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objectives was to help achieve peace with Israel's security 
and thus keep the Soviets "informed but not involved". 
According to Rubenberg, the US policy focused on "facilita-
ting a disengagement between Israel and Egypt and between 
Israel and Syria; laying the ground work for a separate, 
bilateral Egyptian-Israeli peace; persuading Saudi Arabia 
and other OPEC countries to lift the oil embargo; and pre-
paring for a peace conference to find comprehensive, just 
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and lasting peace to the Middle East problems". 
An agreement between Israel and Egypt was reached on 
17 January 1974 with the good offices of the United States 
33 
and Its was known as Sinai I Accord. Under this accord, 
Israel did drop the demand for a formal end to belligerency 
and also agreed to some minor changes in force levels and 
the line of disengagement, while Egypt agreed reduction in 
forces' and equipments. Egypt had also agreed to reopen the 
Suez Canal and to allow the transit of Israeli ships 
through it. 
After having facilitated the Sinai I accord, the US 
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, started making 
attempts to facilitate a Syrian-Israeli disengagement. 
After prolonged negotiations a disengagement accord was 
signed between Israel and Syria on 31 May 1974. Under the 
agreement, Israel was to withdraw from the salient captured 
in October 1973 war, the city of Quneitra and a narrow strip 
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of territory conquered in 1967. The specific disengage-
ment procedures were to be worked out by a joint military 
working group. Technical agreements resulting from this 
accord were signed on 5 June 1974 and provided for the 
exchange of prisoners and other details of the implementa-
35 tion of the agreement. 
The conclusion of Israel-Egyptian and Israeli-
Syrian accords in 1974 had generated considerable optimism 
in the United States about the prospect of an ongoing peace 
process. 
During March 1975, Secretary of State, Henry 
Kissinger, made an attempt to attain a second agreement 
between Israel and Egypt but without any tangible outcome in 
view of differing positions of both Israel and Egypt. In 
late May 1975, a letter signed by seventy-six senators urged 
President Ford to make it clear that "the United States 
acting in its own national interest stands firmly with 
Israel, in the search for peace in future negotiations, and 
that this permise is the basis of the current reassessment 
of the United States policy in the Middle East. This 
letter came at a time when VJashington and Cairo were 
engaged in delicate negotiation aimed at resuming the 
37 Israeli-Egyptian talks. The Egyptian Parliament denounced 
the letter as "a flagrant bias in favour of Israel". 
According to George Bull, a former US Under Secretary of 
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S t a t e , t h e l e t t e r weakened K i s s i n g e r ' s a b i l i t y t o s e c u r e 
c o n c e s s i o n s from I s r a e l and i n c r e a s e d t h e amount of s u b s i d y 
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s had t o pay I s r a e l i n o r d e r t o a c h i e v e 
_ . . _^ 38 S m a i I I . 
I t was only a f t e r p r o t r a c t e d n e g o t i a t i o n s t h a t Henry 
K i s s i n g e r succeeded i n h a v i n g t h e complex of a g r e e m e n t s 
known as S i n a i I I f o r m a l l y i n i t i a t e d on 1 Sep tember 1975, 
wh ich were s i gned in Geneva on 4 September t h a t y e a r by 
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r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of I s r a e l and E g y p t . For a g r e e i n g t o s i gn 
t h e S i n a i I I a cco rd , I s r a e l e x t r a c t e d b i g c o n c e s s i o n from 
Wash ing ton i n t h e form of $ 2 b i l l i o n i n m i l i t a r y and 
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economic a i d a long w i t h new m i l i t a r y h a r d w a r e . 
The adven t of C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in J a n u a r y 1977 
i n i t i a l l y gave t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t Washington was p r e p a r i n g 
i t s e l f t o t a k e a f r e s h a p p r o a c h t o t h e West As ian p r o b l e m . 
The v i s i t of US S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e i n m i d - F e b r u a r y 1977 t o 
I s r a e l and o t h e r Arab c o u n t r i e s was p e r h a p s a p o i n t e r t o t h e 
f o r t h c o m i n g new i n i t i a t i v e . P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r ' s p u b l i c 
p r o n o u n c e m e n t s l a i d e m p h a s i s on need f o r a c o m p r e h e n s i v e 
s e t t l e m e n t of West A s i a n p r o b l e m , r e c o n v e n i n g of Geneva 
41 C o n f e r e n c e and c e n t r a l i t y of t h e P a l e s t i n i a n i s s u e . 
A c c o r d i n g t o Wil l iam Q u a n d t , P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r was "open ly 
commi t ted t o an a c t i v e Amer ican r o l e i n t r y i n g t o b r e a k t h e 
d e a d l o c k i n A r a b - I s r a e l n e g o t i a t i o n s . He saw t h e Middle 
E a s t d i s p u t e a s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o bo th t h e e n e r g y c r i s i s 
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and the danger of superpower confrontation. He was also 
42 
convinced that progress must be made in 1977...." 
However, Israel disapproved of President Carter's 
three-pronged approach. Even when President Carter, on 
1 October 1977, participated in issuing joint Soviet-
American statement on the Middle East which mainly referred 
to comprehensive settlement, Geneva Conference and 
43 Palestinian issue. Israel reacted vehemently to it. 
Yigal Allon, former Foreign Minister of Israel pronounced 
44 it" unnecessary ill-timed, and ill-phrased". Israeli 
Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan s visit to Washington and his 
meeting with President Carter on 4 October 1977 proved 
instrumental in bringing a change in Carter's stance in West 
Asia particularly on Israel. The Israeli-US joint 
communique issued after Dayan s visit, included US commit-
ments that resolutions 242 and 338 would remain the basis 
45 for the resumption of Geneva Conference. This changed 
stance was discernible in President Carter's address to the 
UN General Assembly on 4 October 1977 where he laid stress 
on the need for a "true peace" based on resolutions 242 and 
338 and stated that Israel must have "borders that are 
recognised and secure and reiterated America's absolute 
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commitment to Israel's security. 
During the later months of 1977 and early month of 
1978, bilateral negotiations continued between Egypt and 
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Israel to remove the main irritants in their relationship 
and to resume steps for normalizing the relations. But 
there was no fruitful outcome. During July 1978, United 
States facilitated a meeting of Egyptian and Israeli 
representatives at this to break the deadlock. However, 
Israel's inflexible attitude in conceding Egyptian demands 
let the impasse continue. On 23 July 1978, Israeli 
Prime-Minister Menachem Begin responded to Sadat's plea for 
a "goodwill gesture" from Israel - for example, the return 
of Mt. Sinai to get the talks going on again, with a blant 
reports". Not even one grain of desert sand. Nobody can 
47 get any thing for nothing". 
In view of the prevailing stalemate. President 
Carter took the initiative of inviting Prime Minister of 
Israel and Egypt for a summit meeting to Camp David, in the 
mountains of maryland in USA. Consequently on 5 September 
1978, Israeli Prime-Minister Begin, Egyptian President, 
Sadat, and President Carter, alongwith their respective 
aides were closetted for thirteen days at Camp David. The 
protracted negotiations resulted in producing two documents 
on 17 September 1978: (a) A framework for peace in the 
Middle East; and (b) a framework for the conclusion of a 
48 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. The Camp David 
accords invoked adverse reaction in the Arab World leading 
32 
to Egypt's expulsion from Arab League and suspension of 
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economic assistance from Saudi Arabia. 
From then onward, Washington concentrated its 
efforts on facilitating a peace treaty between Israel and 
Egypt within the framework of Camp David accords. By the 
end of September 1978, Israel had hinted about its willing-
ness to evacuate from Sinai in case a peace treaty was 
signed between Israel and Egypt. Consequently, during the 
second week of October 1978, under the auspices of the 
United States, the representatives of Israel and Egypt 
started negotiations for a peace treaty. The protracted 
negotiations between October 1978 till March 1979 involved 
five difficult months of bickering and arguing and 
ultimately on 26 March 1979 an Egyptian-Israeli peace 
treaty was signed. The final treaty contained no 
significant departure from the Camp David framework, except 
that the first document, the frame -work for peace, was 
rendered meaningless. 
The political mileage which President Carter had 
intended to incur by facilitating the conclusion of 
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was not so favourable to him. 
During his visit to Israel on 10 March 1979, President 
Carter was greeted with considerable hostility and extensive 
haggling. Even in the American media also, there was 
mixed reaction. As he later wrote that he was "disgusted" 
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with the American press' negative comments about the 
agreements being "bought at a price of $ 10 to $ 20 billion 
52 
and involving a mutual defence treaty with Israel. 
The foregoing analysis makes it amply clear that 
with US support, political, economic and military Israel 
was able to assert its superiority in the region. In fact, 
Washington had a pro-Israeli "tilt" in its policy towards 
West Asia. The United States not only helped Israel during 
the October 1973 war, but also built up pressure on Egypt to 
make concessions to Israel for signing the Camp David 
accords and Egypt-Israeli peace treaty. 
1.5 Establishment of 'CENTO'; 
Middle East has always been an area of great concern 
for US due to pressure of huge oil resources and its 
strategic location attracted more. After the second World 
War both superpowers fully realised the strategic signifi-
cance of oil for its own and as a means of denying vital 
oil supplies to the adversary. General Eisenhower, even 
commented that there was no area strategically more 
important than the Gulf. 
Western Nations did not take any tangible steps 
until beginning of the 1950s and relied considerably upon 
the British presence in the area. But, Britain, who had 
traditionally barred the Russian advance towards India, 
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was too weak after the World War II to checkmate Russian 
moves single-handedly. Perceiving the direct Soviet threat 
to the region, by the early fifties, with British assis-
tance, the US was seeking ways to develop defence arrange-
ments for Middle-Eastern countries. In 1951- 5^ efforts were 
made initially to establish a Middle East command sponsored 
bytheUSjthe UK, France and Turkey, and then a proposal for 
Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO) was put forward. 
Both schemes, however, failed, principally because they were 
unable to invoke the desired level of interest among the 
Middle Eastern states. The dissensions among the local 
states such as Iraq-Egypt rivalry or Indo-Pak Hostilities, 
Arab-Israel conflicts and local states (Iran and Egypt) 
unsettled dispute with Britain over oil and suze base, also 
contributed a substantive share towards the collapse of 
these defence schemes. Arab States were too pre-occupied 
with their conflict with Israel to think of participating in 
an alliance under western leadership to contain Soviet 
Union. 
In the spiring of 1953 Dulles toured the area and on 
his return optimistically remarked that the Middle East 
Defence Organization was a thing of the future and suggested 
that the idea of MEDO did not attract sufficient attention 
mainly because it originated outside and not within the 
region. Since the idea was mooted by the West, it attracted 
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somewhat hesitant considerations. According to Dulles, a 
vague desire to have a collective security arrangements 
exited among the countries of the Middle East, and asserted 
that the US could usefully help in inter- related defence. 
During 1954 the question of Middle East Defence grew 
the urgency because Bratain abandoned the Suze base in 
October and the Anglo- Iraqi treaty of 1930 was about to 
expire. A Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement was signed 
between Iraq and US on April 21, 1954, and later in the year 
the Iraqi Premier, Nuri-es-said Pasha, proposed the widening 
and strengthening the Arab League's collective security 
pact of 1950. In this connection he travelled to Cairo, 
London and Istanbul and found both the British and Turks 
receptive to the idea of collective security in the Middle 
East but was unable to convince the Egyptian leader. 
Realising that it would not be easy to convince the Arab 
countries to support the collective Defence arrangements for 
the Middle East in which countries of the West would be 
participants- unless the problem of Suez and Palestine were 
resolved to the satisfaction of the concerned Arab 
countries, Nuri-es-Said began to quickly work for a defence 
pact between Turkey and Iraq. Consequently on February 24, 
1955 Iraq and Turkey signed a pact of mutual cooperation at 
Baghdad. Britain joined the pact on April 5, Pakistan 
decided to join on June 30, 1955 and Iran became a signatory 
on November 3, 1955.^"^ 
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The Baghdad Pact provided that "the high contracting 
parties will cooperate for their security and defence, but 
that such measures as they agreed to take may from the 
subject of special agreements with each other also, that 
this pact shall be open for acussion to any member state of 
the Arab League or any other State actively concerned with _ 
the'Securities ' and teace' in this region and which is fully 
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recognized by both the high contracting parties. 
After the July 1958 revolution, Iraq ceased to 
participate in pact activities, in October the head-
quarters were shifted to Ankara, in March 1959 Iraq formally 
relinquished her membership, and in August the name of the 
organization %/a& changed to the Central Treaty Organization 
(CENTO). 
Although the US had canvassed for Baghdad Pact and 
later fully participated in its work, but never officially 
signed the treaty. Ambassador Waldemar J. Gallman, United 
State observer at the council meeting in November 1955, 
gave two reasons why the US thought that she could 
contribute more by remaining out of the Pact: (i) It was 
perceived that formal US adherence to the pact was likely to 
further estrange Egypt and other Arabs, and (ii) it was 
thought that US participation might invoke an Israeli 
counter demand for a 'Mutual Defence Treaty' especially in 
view of the fact that the Baghdad Pact came into existence 
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through the efforts of an Arab country Iraq, and it could 
become an issue in the next Presidential election. And a 
treaty with Israel would cause the Arabs, including Iraq, 
to reject alliances with the US and make them receptive to 
Soviet. Though the US actively participated in all the 
important committees of the pact, including the military 
committee, her refusal to became full member cast a doubt 
upon the degree of her commitment to the alliance, and 
contracted strangely with her conduct as the chief sponsore 
of the pact. 
1.6 Eisenhower Doctrine; 
In the Post-War, the US has gradually advanced its 
strategic interests in the direction of Gulf. The Truman 
Doctrine of 1947 did not go beyond Turkey. The Eisenhower 
doctrine in 1958 applied mainly to che fertile crescent. 
It was the Nixon Doctrine of propping up the "Regional 
Influentials" that finally reached down to the Gulf The 
two pillar policy was an instrument of operationalising the 
Nixon Doctrine. 
Neverthless, with the British abdication,- the 
United States did support the State of Israel, soon becoming 
its sole protector. To start with, during the 1950s, the 
56 US-Israel relationship was decidedly uneasy'. But after 
the upsurge of radical nationalism in the 1950s and 
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especially after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, successive US 
administrations 'increasingly came to accept the Israeli 
thesis that a powerful Israel is a "Strategic asset".— 
Serving as a barrier against indigenous radical nationalist 
57 threats, which might gain support from the USSR'. 
By the mid-fifties, with the Shah restored in Iran, 
Eisenhower sought to strengthen the US position in the 
Middle East through the creation of anti-Soviet alliance. 
And so, through the Orchestration of Dulles, a series of 
bilateral pacts with Turkey and Pakistan were cemented by 
the British ,Iraqi and Iranian membership into the Baghdad Pact 
of 1955. If the United States saw the pact as a means of 
collective defence (as well as providing a cover for 
considerable internal reoression, especially in Iran), the 
British were also concerned to defend their interests in 
Iran as well as strengthen Iraq vis-a-vis Nasser' s Egypt. 
Eden saw Nasser as a threat to Britain's great power status 
which rested upon leadership of the common wealth, the 
sterling area and access (via the Suez Canal) to Sterling -
58 denominated oil. 
1.7 U.S. & the Israel-Palestine Peace Accords; 
For decades, the Palestinian problem had been 
captive to the conflict between Arabs and Jews in the Middle 
East, to be used by both to garner support for their 
39 
territorial ambitions (as did Saddam Hussein when he sought 
to legitimise his invasion of Kuwait in 1991 by portraying 
it as a noble attempt to promote the liberation of Palestine 
59 from Zionist occupation), and for perpetuating their 
individual animosities against each other. Now that a 
glimmer of hope to end the state of hostility in the region 
can be seen with the signing of the Declaration of 
Principles between the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
(PLO) and Israel (and more recently the Declaration of Peace 
between Israel and Jordan), it remains to be seen whether 
the September accord can become a catalyst to wider regional 
reconciliation. 
Though the first tentative steps towards peace in 
the region have been executed with the return of the PLO 
leader, Yasser Arafat, in July to Gaza after 27 years spent 
in self-imposed exile, a deep sense of scepticism persists, 
both among Palestinians and Israelis. While there was over-
whelming support for peace to return to the Middle East, the 
manner in which it should be achieved has produced deep 
divisions in Israeliand Palestinian organisations. Mistrust 
had been embedded so deeply in Palestinian-Jewish relations 
that extreme actions opposed to the PLO believe that the 
1993 Washington agreement was a sell-out, with Arafat merely 
doing the dirty job of the Israelis - looking after Gaza 
and Jericho. Likewise, in Israel, the Likud faction has 
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been holding a hard- line position on recognising the PLO, 
believing that the labour government has allowed the PLO to 
use the terms of the accord as the first step towards 
eventual Palestinian independence at the cost of Israeli 
.^  60 
security. 
As Arafat seeks to transform the image of the PLO, 
he also attempts to make his own transition from a guerilla 
chief to a potential head of state. In seeking to meet the 
high expectations of the people of Gaza and Jericho, his 
most immediate task will be to tackle the problem of massive 
unemployment, which, according to Western sources, is 
believed to hover in the range of 50 per cent. Politi-
cally, Arafat faces opposition from a home- grown and 
powerful Islamic fundamentalist movement, HAMAS, which is 
still not reconciled to the peace accord. Arafat realises 
that he has to keep the peace process moving, if only to 
show his critics that Gaza-Jericho is merely the first step 
on the road towards an independent Palestinian state in all 
of the lands seized by Israel in 1967. 
Arafat's return to Gaza has been symptomatic if the 
enormity of the hurdles that have presented themselves since 
the inception of the peace process. At the signing ceremony 
of the Israeli-Paliestinian agreement in Cairo on 4 May,1994 
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the Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak, who has played a key 
role in the peace process, said, "We are living today one of 
those historic moments when we witness the signing of 
the . ...agreement on establishing the Palestinian authority 
in the Gaza Strip and Jericho as the first stage of 
Palestinian-Israeli Peace." The ceremony was not without 
its histrionics as PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin were palpably betraying their 
nervousness about initialling a conclusive deal that would 
bring peace and normalcy to the Middle East. In fact, not 
many people believed that such an event could take place 
and, as the Israeli Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, said. 
"There were moments when it almost looked as if everything 
was falling apart", especially after the gunning down of 
about 30 Palestinian worshippers at a mosque in Hebron by a 
fanatical Jewish settler and the following retaliatory 
killing of Jews by members of militant Palestinian groups. 
Despite Israel's acceptance of the PLO as the most 
representative body of the Palestinian people and its 
decision to end 27 years of occupation, the peace process 
has remained vulnerable to several factors - internal and 
external - that have prevented concrete steps from being 
taken. Though the replacement of Israeli security forces by 
a Palestinian police force in Gaza and Jericho has been 
achieved, bigger and politically explosive issues like the 
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future of Jerusalem, continue to cloud the success of the 
Washington accord. The release of hundreds of Palestinian 
prisoners has become a bone of contention with Arafat 
insisting that their release should be unconditional and en 
masse. Arafat's jihad speech, though later retracted, had 
caused a furore and more recently, the PLO Chairman's 
attempt to bring into Gaza for PLO officials charged with 
crimes against Israel in 1974, had provided an unexpected 
hurdle when Israel closed the border, leading to rioting 
and subsequent death of some Palestinians. 
If Arafat has had to deal with a government in 
Tel Aviv which has continued to proceed with extreme caution 
and a sense of history, he faces growing opposition from 
within the Palestinian community in Gaza and the West Bank. 
HAMAS has posed a severe challenge to his authority and 
stature as the most effective leader of the Palestinian 
people. Attitudes of fellow Arabs too have not helped, and 
in fact have left Palestinians feeling more insecure. On 
25 July, 1994 despite repeated assurances of negotiating 
for a comprehensive peace. King Hussein of Jordan signed the 
Declaration of Peace with Israel in Washington, formally 
ending the state of war that has exist; d between the two 
states for almost 47 years, with promises of negotiating a 
complete peace treaty in the near future. Though at first 
Arafat welcomed the accord, the clause confirming King 
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Hussein's status as guardian of the Muslim holy sites in 
Jerusalem, shocked and infuriated Palestinians, leading to 
protests and demonstrations, as it seemed to confirm their 
suspicions of Israeli commitment to the establishment of a 
future Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. 
Now, as Israel and Jordan move closer towards establishing 
formal relations, Arafat, afraid of being left behind, feels 
the necessity of speeding up the peace process in the 
Occupied Territories. For unless Arafat managers to maintain 
the momentum and move on to the next step- extension of self-
rule from Gaza- Jericho across the rest of the West Bank-
he will lose the confidence of his people, and consequently 
any means of controlling the entire peace process. 
Linitiation of Israel- PLO Contacts: 
Formal negotiations towards finding a permanent 
solution for the problems in the Middle East began in 
1990, though the roots of the peace process can be traced 
back to a couple of decades prior. In fact, soon after the 
1967 Six Day War and more obviously after the 1973 Yom 
Kippur War, there was a growing perception amongst both 
Arabs as well as within a section of Israeli society that it 
was futile to remain in a permanent state of war. Although 
the impact of these wars helped to produce the Egyptian-
Israeli peace treaty of 1979, it was not for another decade 
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that concrete steps were taken towards establishing 
peace. 
One of the most important motivating factors that 
resulted in the Israel- PLO rapproachment was the ending of 
the Cold War and the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union. 
Cold War politics which were firmly entrenched in the Middle 
East had acquired a notion of intractability. This resulted 
from the super powers seeking to maintain their respective 
spheres of influence in the region. The US was formally 
committed to keeping Israel's qualitative military edge and 
the Soviet Union was a key backer of the PLO and other Arab 
states in the region. In the Post- Cold War period, the 
Russian- Federation was unable to continue opposing the US in 
different parts of the globe and without an ideological 
difference with Washington, if found itself unable to 
justify supporting the PLO and its hard- line stand of 
refusing to recognise the right of Israel to exist. 
The second contributing factor to a shift in the 
PLO's attitude v/as the development of an indigenous 
movement, the Intifada, in the West Bank and Gaza in 
December 1987. Though it exacted a heavy toll in lives, the 
fact that Palestinians began to stand up to their Israeli 
occupiers, imbued them with a sense of pride. In the early 
years, the Intifada movement appeared to be guided by the 
PLO but later, the leadership pattern in the movement began 
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showing signs of growing militancy, and with the PLO head-
quarters almost 1000 miles away in Tunis, it became 
increasingly difficult for it to control the movement. 
Moreover the Intifida did not work on the assumption that 
the PLO or Arab States would intervene after right 
conditions had been created in the occupied territories. 
A third reason was the weakening of the PLO itself. 
After the Gulf War and Arafat's decision to side with Saddam 
Hussein, the PLO lost the backing of its major bankers - the 
Saudis, Kuwaitis, UAE, Syria and Libya - who felt betrayed 
by their beneficiary. Not only were Palestinians in these 
countries meted out hard treatment, the PLO was politically 
ostracised and within a month of the end of the war, 
financial support for the PLO was cut off, driving the 
organisation to the verge of bankruptcy. Without funds, 
the PLO had little option but to buy a peace while it was 
worth it. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Gulf 
War in 1991, saw both Arabs and Israelis finding themselves 
in the same boat, as Saddam Hussein sought to legitimise his 
aggression by portraying it as an attempt to liberate 
Palestine from Israel. Both realised that the Palestinian 
problem could always be used against them to justify any 
objective. 
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The Arab- Israel Conflict and Steps Towards a Settlement: 
Jews and Arabs have lived and fought each other for 
a millenium, but never did so on purely religious grounds. 
It was the resurgence of the Zionist movement in the 1880s 
that began to call upon Jews to escape persecution by 
returning to the Promised Land to re create the Land of 
Israel, that began to exacerbate the Palestinian-Jewish 
divide. The Palestinians, whose political development which 
had remained stunted prior to the Zionist movement, now 
began seening the returning Jews as a threat to their claim 
to the land. Therefore, ownership of land became fundamental 
to the Arab Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli conflicts. 
From 1949- 54 the continuing state of war between 
Israel and ito neighbours led to a persistence of clashes 
along new borders and also with Egypt along the Gaza strip. 
But the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt in 1952 changed 
the character of these clashes to one of conflict between 
Israel and a new form of Arab socialism at a time when Egypt 
was also attacking the last vestiges of British rule in 
Egypt and questioning British control over the Suez Canal. 
After August 1953, raids and artillery exchanges became 
common along the border between Israel and the Gaza Strip 
and both sides had begun to prepare for another major war. 
It began in October 1956 when Israeli forces launched a 
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surprise attack in Gaza and along the Suez Canal and rapidly 
swept south meeting with limited resistance from disorga-
nised Egyptian forces. A week later, french and British 
forces joined the Israeli offensive by attacking Egyptian 
positions in the Suez. The US was forced to intervene and 
coerced a withdrawal of British, French and Israeli 
forces. Though Israel was compelled to withdraw to its 
pre- war position in March 1957, tensions continued with 
Egypt, Syria and Jordan. This culminated in a full-scale 
war between Israel on one side and Egypt, Jordan and Syria 
on the other in June 1967. 
The 1967 war was a watershed in the Arab- Israeli 
conflict. Israel's swift victory gave it control over vast 
territories, including control over Jerusalem and the West 
Bank, Gaza Strip and the Sinai desert in Egypt and the 
Golan Heights in Syria. The decisive defeat of combined 
Arab forces not only set back the cause of pan- Arabism, but 
gave Israel the feeling, for the first time, that its 
boundaries were assured. 
For the Arabs, the 1967 war was devastating as they 
were forced to acknowledge the limits to their military and 
political capabilities, and concede to the superiority of 
the Israeli military might. Though the war had effectively 
converted Jordan to the status of a defensive military 
power, defeat had made Syria and Egypt more determined to 
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"eliminate the effects of the Israeli aggression". In 
September 1967, the Arab-summit meeting at Khartoum adopted 
the "three no's - no peace with Israel, no recognition of 
Israel, no negotiation with it, and insistence on the 
rights of the Palestinian people in their own country". 
This policy became sacrosanct, equating any deviation from 
these principles with betrayal to the Arab nation. 
The other important outcome of the war was the 
change in the United States position towards Israel. The 
strategic link between the two was now established and 
Washington had become Israel's staunchest ally and 
supporter, no longer demanding an unconditional withdrawal 
of Occupied Territories by Israel as the basis for a durable 
Arab-Israel peace. It also rejected Soviet and Arab efforts 
to obtain an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-war lines and 
secured the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 242 
in November - withdrawal for peace and no withdrawal without 
a binding peace - which continues to be the focus of the 
Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) till today. This strategic 
linkage was of immense value during the 1973 war, when the 
US Administration ordered a strategic airlift of American 
arms into Israel. 
if the 1967 defeat sowed the seeds of despondency 
among pan-Arab nationalists, it introduced a new element 
into the Arab-Israeli equation with the emergence of the PLO, 
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The PLO was created in May 1964, when the Palestinian cause 
was overwhelmed by pan-Arab rhetoric. In 1969, the PLO was 
taken over by the then counter-establishment organisation 
headed by Al Fatah, under the leadership of Yasser Arafat. 
It was partly because of the personality of Arafat, the 
commitment of the Al Fatah group to use arms against Israel 
and the radical solutions that it advocated for the 
Palestinian cause that it became widely recognised and 
accepted as the representative of Palestinian national 
ambitions. 
From late 1970 and throughout 1971, PLO raids into 
Israel took place from Syria with Israel retaliating. By 
September 1972, a pattern had been established - Syria 
regularly shelled Israel and Israel retaliated with air 
strikes. Finally, in October 1973, Egypt and Syria launched 
a surprise attack on Israel which, though brirfly 
threatening Israel's control of the Sinai and Golan ended 
with the Israeli armed forces placed in better positions. 
The bulk of the Egyptian Third Army was surrounded and the 
Israeli forces occupied a strategic position all along the 
Canal . 
With pressure from the US and USSR to halt the 
fighting, Israel and Egypt agreed to a ceasefire in October. 
Though the October war - better known as the Yom Kippur war-
was an Arab military defeat it was also a partial Arab 
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po]itica] and strategic victory, particularly for Egypt, 
for it showed that it could carry out a successful major 
attack and resist Israel's best forces. At the same time, 
Egyptian President the late Anwar Sadat realised that 
further fighting was unlikely to have a more successful 
outcome. It could, on the other hand, trigger off a super-
power intervention that could have forced Israel to use its 
nuclear deterrent if the security to the borders of the 
country were threatened. Sadat, realising the inextricable 
linkage between peace and the recognition of the state of 
Israel, began taking incremental steps in that direction. 
In September 1974, he concluded an expanded disengagement 
agreement that ended with a visit to Jerusalem and the 
subsequent Camp David accords of 1978. It gained him 
territory in the form of the recovery of the Sinai, built up 
structures for ?n enduring peace with Israel that has lasted 
till now, though it did lead Egypt into temporary ostraci-
zation in the Arab World, and a hardening of political 
opposition, internally and externally. 
Meanwhile, in December 1987, Palestinians, des-
pairing of external deliverance and resolving to rely on 
themselves began the Intifada, taking both Israel and the 
PLO by surprise. It created a major new internal security 
threat to the occupying Israeli forces while at the same 
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time creating a Palestinian movement independet of the PLO 
leadership. 
With the Intifada, Israel's perception of its 
security environment slowly began to change. It realised 
that its interna] security problems could wrench the 
country apart unless solutions were found for dealing with 
violence and the political sources of Palestinian discontent-
And in 1988, when Iraq defeated Iran, it received a further 
stock. Israel feared the Arab World would fall under the 
spell of Saddam Hussein, and sure enough, during the spring 
of 1990, Saddam's rhetoric against Israel found a receptive 
audience in Arab capitals. 
In November 1988, some 90 nations formally recog-
nised the existence of the state of Palestine, and the US 
entered into a dialogue with the PLO, now recognised as the 
sole representative of the Palestinian people. In December, 
Yasser Arafat announced his support for a two-state solution 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict and accepted the right of 
Israel to exist. The talks lasted till June 1990, but broke 
off because the PLO refused to condemn terrorist attacks on 
Israel . 
A whole realignment of the geopolitical situation 
also brought about a change in attitudes among the political 
elite in the region. With the end of super-power rivalry 
Israel realised it could not continue its occupation of the 
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West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights without creating some 
friction with Washington. And finally in 1990, Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait created new dangers for Israel as both 
Jordan and the PLO tilted towards Saddam. Though Saddam was 
defeated by the Allied forces, Israel's inability to defend 
itself against Scud bombardment during the war made it 
conscious of its own vulnerabilities. 
However, for the Arabs, the new strategic land-
scape of the region created more tensions. The Arab world 
was bitterly divided over the Gulf War and the US victory in 
the war, together with the end of the Cold War allowed Iran, 
Israel and Turkey to enhance their power in the region. 
Those countries, especially Syria, which had dpended on the 
Soviet Union to counterbalance US influence in the region, 
now had to change their perceptions towards the latter. 
Also with the Soviet Union's diminishing influence as a 
world power and its eventual break-up in 1991, left the US 
as the sole regional power. Therefore, for previously 
hostile Arab states good relations with the US were now very 
essential . 
For the US, two dominant reasons influence its 
Middle East policy. First, the feat of successive adminis-
trations that the states of this oil-rich region may fall 
under the control of hostile countries and interrupt the 
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flow of reasonably-prices oil. For this good relations with 
Arab countries is necessary. Second, it is committed to the 
survival of Israel. For this, it was imperative that a 
diplomatic solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict be found. 
In 1991 Palestinian leaders in the West Bank and 
Gaza convinced the PLO leadership of the necessity of 
joining a US-sponsored peace process which had begun in 
Madrid in October 1991. By now the PLO leadership had also 
come to realize the need for a compromise, declaring that 
"forty years of violence have got us nowhere". Therefore, 
when the Soviet Union and the US issued the Palestinians 
joint invitations to the peace conference in Madrid along 
with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, the PLO leader, 
Yasser Arafat, after consultations with the presidents of 
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria on the "Arab position" on 
key issues and agreeing that no country would sign separate 
peace settlements with Israel, flew to Madrid to attend the 
talks, despite Iran's condemnation and accusation of 
treason. 
The Road to Peace 
In Madrid, Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian 
representatives held direct talks in which they agreed to 
work towards self-rule for the West bank and Gaza and to 
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base their talks on UN resolutions 2A2 and 338. They also 
agreed that future talks would be conducted on "two 
tracks" - Palestinian - Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli. Syria 
and Israel concluded the first direct talks and agreed to 
meet again, though no location or date for future talks were 
agreed upon. Thereafter, the Middle East peace talks 
recessed indefinitely while US officials worked to find a 
compromise location for future talks. 
From December 1992, all the parties from the Madrid 
talks, encouraged by the US, met periodically to continue 
bilateral talks. But despite protracted negotiations, very 
little, if any, progress was achieved as the leaders of one 
country after a other raised objections over some point or 
the other, sometimes over the location, sometimes over 
dates. The only encouraging sign was that all parties agreed 
to continue negotiations. 
In 1992 the US issued invitations to the second 
phase of the peace talks - five separate sessions addressing 
regional issues concerned with economic development, 
refugees, water resources, environment and arms control. 
Regional talks had already opened in Moscow in later 
January. But when multilateral "working group" peace talks 
began in Brussels in May to discuss economic development of 
the six core participants, only Jordan and the Palestinians 
attended. 
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Though multilateral talks on water resources were 
held in Vienna, in Ottawa on refugees and in Tokyo on 
environmental concerns all negotiations concluded with no 
major breakthroughs except that participants agreed to 
continue discussions at some future date. It was not until 
the formation of a coalition government under Yitzhak 
Rabin's Labour Party in June 1992 that some progress to be 
made. Israel moved towards a more moderate position, 
halting new settlements, easing restrictions on Palestinians 
and tightening rules of engagement in confrontation between 
the Israeli defense forces and Palestinian youth. It also 
made it clear that it was willing to play a more aggressive 
role in the peace process and move towards a higher and more 
rapid degree of Palestinian autonomy in the Occupied 
Territories. 
In August 1992, the sixth round of bilateral peace 
talks began in Washington - the first since the election of 
the Labour Party in Israel. Though this round too ended 
with no concrete results, a softening of the Israeli 
position was observed. Israel presented the Palestinian 
delegation with a set of proposals leading to the establish-
ment of an elected Palestinian "administrative control" in 
the West and Gaza, which would be responsible for running 
various aspects of daily life, but with no legislative 
powers. After studying the proposals, the Palestinians 
56 
rejected it as it did not yield a "meaningful transfer of 
authority" to them. To the Syrians, Israel conceded for the 
first time that UN resolution 242 applied to the Golan 
Heights. Syria, in turn, presented them with a document in 
which it formally committed to reaching a peace settlement 
with Israel and acknowledged Israel's security concerns. 
Israel, though disagreeing with many parts of the text, 
welcomed the "change in tone". 
Finally the breakthrough came, and suddenly the 
likelihood of an end to 45 years of mutual hatred and fear 
seemed possible. For some time secret talks had been going 
on in Oslo which had succeeded in building enough trust to 
impel the Palestinians and Israelis to take the first 
step- recognition. This culminated in the signing, in 
September 1993, the Declaration of Principles for 
Palestinian self-rule at a splashy ceremony in Washington 
amongst much fanfare. The two sides pledged that they 
would "strive to live in peaceful co- existence and mutual 
dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and 
comprehensive peace and settlement and historic reconci-
liation." This was followed by procedures and timetables 
for Israeli redeployment and Palestinian self- government, 
first in the Gaza-Strip and Jericho, then in the rest of the 
West Bank by the end of the year. This date was later 
postponed to April 1994, and after the massacre in February 
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at the Hebron mosque of about 30 Palestinians by a fanatical 
Jewish settler, it seemed that the talks would break down 
completely. 
However, with the return of Arafat to Gaza in July, 
the process was revived and Israeli troops withdrew as 
planned. But celebrations notwithstanding, most 
Palestinians, even those committed to peace, felt let down 
by what they saw as an increasingly discredited process. 
For to them the peace process represented capitulation. 
After the historic handshake between the Israeli and PLO 
leaders in Washington in September 1993, their hopes had 
been heightened and the deal that followed was bound to fall 
far short of their expectations. And the recent signing of 
the Declaration of Peace between Israel and Jordan seems to 
have confirmed all their fears that Israel is not serious. 
about withdrawing completely from the Occupied Territories, 
and certainly not from Jerusalem. They cannot help 
wondering what further concessions Arafat may make to 
Israel. 
Motives for Peace: 
That the PLO and Israel settle for peace is 
imperative for not only the Arabs and Israelis but also the 
Americans. Although the likelihood of a an all-out war 
between Arabs and Jews is limited, it remains a distinct 
threat and would serve to undermine US interests in the 
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region. With growing militancy,the fear that oil facilities 
in the gulf may be threatened is real, thereby hitting at 
its economic interests makes the US eager for an end to 
hostilities and emergence of real peace in the region. 
For Arafat, who faces opposition, both from within 
the PLO and other fundamentalist organisations, it is 
important that he shifts the focus of the people of the 
Occupied Territories towards economic re- construction and 
keeps the process moving. A quick extension of Palestinian 
self- rule to the West Bank will vindicate his negotiating 
gambit and confound his critics who have warned that the 
deal was an Israeli plcy to leave Palestinians with an 
apartheid- like state. 
On the other hand, the agreement with the PLO has 
helped Israel to break out of isolation in the Middle East. 
When Israel and the PLO signed the accord in September, 
Jordan's King Hussein, who, despite appearances had been 
quitely negotiating with Israel for months, was worried that 
with the PLO gaining strength in the West Bank, he would be 
"systematically left out by the Palestinians and Egypt in an 
obvious attempt to marginalise him". Therefore, a month 
after secret talks in London in May, Israel and Jordan 
agreed to conduct high level talks on their own territory, 
which culminated in the signing of the Washington Declara-
tion of Peace in July. 
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The PLO-Israel accord also gave Tel Aviv sufficient 
leverage when dealing with Damascus, and has given Syria 
the chance to develop some form of limited peace with Israel 
without overtly being seen to sacrifice the Palestinian 
cause. Though President Hafez al-Assad had given the PLO-
Israeli accord his distant approval, and kept a tactful 
silence on the Israeli- Jordanian Pact, he is not happy 
about being made to look as though he was following Arafat 
and Hussein instead of taking the lead on behalf of the 
Palestinains. Also, since Assad is seeking closer relations 
with the US and the removal of his country from America's 
list of state sponsors of terrorism, and has seen the 
material rewards Jordan has reaped from initiating peace, 
he may accelerate his step in the negotiation (Assad is 
seeking total Israeli withdrawal from the Golan in return for 
"full peace"). 
Even as the Israeli flag is replaced by the 
Palestinian, and Palestinians allow themselves to feel a 
cautious sense of hope as they get ready for a sort of 
self- rule, first in Jericho and then in the rest of the West 
Bank, the realise that this is only the beginning towards 
the long and difficult road to peace. There are still many 
impediments to be overcome before any real peace can be 
established in the Middle East. 
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CHAPTER - II 
ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE AND THE U.S. 
ROLE IN IT 
2.1 Israel Security Perceptions : 
Security is the central problem of the Israel's 
existence, from the beginning of the State, the Israel's 
thinking has been clear about the importance of security 
and its centrality. All appearance of life in Israel 
directly or indirectly relate to national survival and 
security. David Ben Gurion had said, "the security of 
Israel is not a matter of protection, the independence, 
territory, borders or sovereignty but it is matter of 
survival". Israelis are worried about their security 
which covers the whole spectrum of what is defined aF 
protecting the national interest. Shimon Peres the former 
Prime Minister has defined security of Israel : "The 
Israeli security implies immigration, and it means 
settlement. Security includes control of the sea and the 
air... Security is the development of scientific research 
and scientific aptitude in all disciplines, physic, 
chemistry, biology and advanced technology. The security 
of Israel is the mobilization of our youth and the 
involvement of the people and its scholar in the pursuit 
of difficult and vital objectives. Settlement, defense and 
integration of the exiles. Security is not a limited 
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function but a multiple effort, it is like a high-tension 
cable, concentrating national energy and using it to 
reinforce the nation's ability to survive. It is both 
2 
existing energy and potential energy". "The Israeli 
governments have placed Israel security before everything 
else, even before peace. Israel believes that security 
without peace was peace but'peace without security was no 
3 
peace at all". 
According to most Israelis the term "security" in 
its absolute sense includes economic, legal and political 
4 
concern. Some Israelis define it as requiring the 
preservation of both Jewish and domestic character of the 
5 
State. Martino Van Greveld has said that Israel's 
security has two meanings : "first, the ability of 
individual Israeli citizens to work, travel and sleep 
without being bombed by terrorist or shelled from across 
the border. Second, srcurity means dealing with the 
perceived threat to Israel's existence as a state and as a 
nation". 
Israelis think that the concept of comprehensive 
security would help them in their struggle with their 
enemies. Within Israel the beginning of security is a 
result of the perception of military threat. It is clear 
that, the survival of the Jewish state is the undisputed 
goal shared by the whole nation, the uniformity of the 
goal prevents segmented attention to internal and external 
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threats. "The choice of instruments to achieve the goal is 
often subjected to heated political and bureaucratic 
7 debates". 
"The council for peace and security" was 
established in March 1988 by the several retired Israeli 
generals headed by Aharon Yarive, former chief of military 
intelligence, which declared that "Israel's security 
depended upon its armed forces and not upon the occupied 
territories". 
Both on the physical plan and in the value sphere 
the centrality of security dictated a stringent military 
and political concept of national defense and made 
security a vitually important factor in the political 
system. Therefore, national security is perceived as a 
central value and decisive factor in shaping of Israel's 
foreign policy to become an extension of national defense 
policy. JMoshe Dayan said, "small nations do not have 
g 
foreign policy; they have defense policy". 
Individually and collectively Israelis believes 
that Arab goal would not only annihilate the state as a 
political entity but also destroy their population. 
Israeli knows that Arab would never agree to Israel's 
existence, and Israeli security has always been based on 
"a worse case analysis" maintaining that Israel cannot 
afford to take the risk of loosing war because military 
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defeat of Israel would mean the physical elimination of 
the Jewish State. "Israel cannot afford to lose a single 
war as to lose a single war is to lose every thing and 
this is the most and stark fact". Ben Gurion has stated: 
"Israel may win a hundred battles, yet its problems will 
not be solved but if the Aras are victorious only once as 
it will mean our end". 
The people of Israel were entirely given over the 
deep sorrow and anxity for their men who lost their lives, 
and who were prisoners and wounded in 1973 war. Therefore, 
a psychological disaster and Israeli public faith in the 
12 labour leadership was disturbed. Thus, the Israeli 
national security is as much as psychological concept as 
it is a physical one. The Israeli security will continue 
to be linked with the military capabilities of the Arabs. 
In 1956 Israel attacked Egypt in the name of prevention 
and in the 1967 Egypt, Syria and Jordan in the name of 
13 pre-emption. In 1967 was Israel justified its expansion 
and occupation by removing hostile forces and taking 
control of the strategic cliff overlooking Jordan Valley. 
The security of Israeli civilian life is the issue and 
Israel is to thrust its civilian line forward across the 
Golan Heights and nearer the Syrian military line, on the 
pretext of peace for Galilee, their northern settlement 
Israel occupied in southern lebanon in 1982. 
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The expansionist character of Israel was clear on 
July 30, 1980, when the Israeli parliament proclaimed that 
Jerusalem is the permanent capital, in a challenge to the 
entire world. To desire earnestly to restore the biblical 
boundaries Israeli expansionist aims are thus presented as 
a religious crusade, and are suspected that Israel has 
aspiration beyond the Palestine territory. Israel aspires 
to establish a Jewish State not only in Palestine but also 
from the Nile (Egypt) to Euphrates (Iraq) and Israel hopes 
to find the opportunity. Moshe Shapira Israel's 
immigration Minister, admitted that without Jerusalem, 
Israel is an amputated state. "True Israel agreed to be a 
state without Jerusalem in 1947 but it merely waited until 
opportunity arose to rectify the situation". Menahem 
Begin admitted before Israeli soldiers 15 year later that 
"Egyptian troops concentrations in Sinai in May 1967 did 
not prove that Naseer was really about to attack us we 
must be honest with overselves, we decided to attack 
him".^^ 
Lebanese fear of Israeli annexation of south of 
the Litani river became known on several occasions. 
Mordechai Eliyahu, Chief Rabbi of Israel has stated : 
"Without doubts, southern Lebanon is part of the land of 
our forefather. Tyre, like part Sidon, is our forefather's 
land one need only take a look at a map showing a tribal 
division to see for one's self". 
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Border : 
The Israeli leaders always ignored the border and 
avoid at a definite conclusion about the demarcation of 
their respective territories. The former Israeli Prime 
Minister Golda Meir once states that "the frontier is where 
18 the Jews live and not where there is a line on the map". 
The Israelis claimed that a considerable part of the 
armistic line that existed until June 4, 1967 are without 
any topographical security value and of less importance to 
19 Israel with the essential minimum of strategic depth. 
Israel is looking for a border with strategic significance 
that would provide it with requisite minimal strategic 
depth. According to Israel's "Bible" the Lord of Israelis", 
The Lord of Israel is God of the Hills but he is not God of 
the Valleys" (I. Kings 20:28).^ Israelis believe that the 
border is not secured by treaty or guarantee but rather one 
that is secured in itself. Golda Meir once emphasized". 
There is no guarantee of our security by others but 
physical conditions and boundaries created in this country 
21 
which will guarantee us. The discussion about the 
security guarantee is more complex than the discussion 
about borders, the new Zionist school of thought believes 
that more the territory under the Israeli control, the more 
Jewish and the more Zionist the state would be. On the 
other hand for labour and the peace movement the greater 
the territory under Israeli control and less Zionist the 
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state will be because of the presence of the Arabs. The 
Israeli concept of security revolves around the following 
elements : 
1. Keeping the occupied t e r r i t o r i e s 
2. Large-scale immigration 
3. Establ ishing new set t lements 
Keeping the Occupied Territories : 
The occupied territories have formed a major 
element in the concept of Israeli security after the June 
War, and they provide a strategic buffer to sacrifice 
23 territory to absorb an Arab attack. 
The reason why Israel saved the 1973 war, was that 
Arabs had been at a distance when began and there was a 
sufficient time for to Israel to stop the attack on the 
several fronts. The Israeli leaders believe that the 
occupied territories are of the decisive geomilitary asset 
for the security of Israel. This led to the massive Jewish 
settlement in the occupied territories and extension of 
Israeli rule over them. West Bank provide a major training 
area for the Israeli defense. It is also a major asset in 
24 dealing with the problems of infiltration operation. 
Large-scale Iramigration ; 
Immigration was a most important and necessary for 
the growth and strengthening of Palestine Jewish community 
for the prosperity of the country and the building of the 
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Jewish national home. The Jewish leaders believed that the 
Jewish state should become the Jews' home land who were 
dispersed across the world. Infact it may be noted that 
without Jewish immigration Israel could never have come to 
exist when Israel came to existence, a new law was passed 
in 19 50, according to which every Jews who arrived from 
outside was automatically an Israeli citizen. "The human 
resources are regarded as one of the important resources in 
the balance of power between Jews and Arabs in general and 
25 between the Jews and Palestinian in particulat". A person 
leaving Israel means weakening of Israel. Moshe Dayan 
quoted Ben-Gurion as frequently saying; "Our main objective 
is immigration, we have to do every thing possible to 
increase it and to attract immigrants from western 
countries in particular. The strengch of the Jewish people 
lies in quality not quantity. And only if we raise our 
quality will be able to stand up to our numberless 
„ 26 
enemies". 
Israel adopted the policy of unlimited immigration. 
Israel Prime Minister Shamir has stated that "Israel must 
continue to give top priority to attracting Jews from all 
27 
over the world that is the essence of the Zionist dream" . 
Israel believed that the Israeli security depended on the 
modern arms from the west and large scale immigration and 
they also believed that if there are five or six or more 
million Jews in Israel nobody would be able to hurt their 
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state its existence. The Jewish immigration in Palestine 
is most dangerous to the Palestinian economic, social, 
religious and political existence. Soviet Jewish 
immigration into Israel threatens to change the geography 
of the occupied territories. 
Establishing New Settlements : 
Israel established new settlements at various 
strategically important places before Israel carae into 
existence and provided there as well as the older 
settlements with trained men and some military equipment. 
These were to play a dlecisive role in enabling the 
28 Israelis to win the 1948 War. After Israel came into 
existence the main principle of Israeli settlement policy 
has been to establish settlements first along the border. 
There was two attitudes en the question of settlements to 
the Israeli security. One maintains that settlements are 
primarily of poitical value that determine the border of 
the state. David Ben Gurion has stated that "Border 
settlements have fulfilled and will continue to fulfill an 
important role in the defense of Israel and it is incumbent 
on us to prepare a chain of settlements across the length 
29 
and breadth of the country". It is clear that the 
settlements in West Bank and Ghaza District have a 
political purpose. They would also break up the contact and 
encircle the density populated Arab areas situated along 
the West Bank's water shed. The main object of these 
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settlements is to make solid option for Israeli annexation 
30 
of at least part of the West Bank. The followers of the 
demography-security approach support the establishment of a 
large number of Jewish settlement that would be scattered 
throughout the West Bank. This kind of settlements would be 
better to held out against a military threat and could be 
31 organized into a regional-defense district. David Ban 
Gurion noted that "Our manner of settlements will be no 
less than methods by which we build the army. Only dense 
agricultural settlement along the border... will serve as a 
very reliable shield for the security of Israel against 
attacks from the outside.... A wall of working and 
productive human being is capable of watching over the 
32 
nation's borders". In the opinion of Moshe Dayan "Settle-
ment has an important and significant value in the creation 
33 
of political facts". 
Israeli settlements and their effort to change the 
character of the occupied territories are based on their 
claim that Judea and Samaria are the biblical Land of Ertz 
Israel. The religious claims have played a much more 
dominant role in the approach to West Bank and the 
formulation of Israel's settlement policy. 
The settlement and security have been inseparable 
for Israel since the first settlers moved into the West 
Bank in September 1967. This has made Israel use the policy 
of "Settlement for Security j^pjpwSctifity-^ JJjN^ srael". These 
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settlements serve Israel's military security interest and 
since 1973 settlement defenses have been greatly 
strengthened. Israeli defense field are now quite massive 
constructions with five position dug into artificial mounds 
created to improve fields of fire and observation. Israeli 
settlements and the settlers are probably armed with 
35 
machine guns, mortars and anti-tank weapons. 
The settlements also maintain substantial stock of 
infantry and anti-tank Weapons. Israeli agriculture 
Minister Areil Sharon said "every settlement has its 
36 purpose and role in the defence of Israel". The Jewish 
settlements in borders areas play an active role in 
Israel's defense and can provide a kind of early warning 
and in war time play a role in static defence. An Israeli 
military officer has stated that "these settlements have 
enabled Israel to seal off its borders from Arab attacks 
and provide Israel with up-front units which can be quickly 
37 integrated into the security plans for the area". 
Hence the Jewish settlements create some powerful 
obstruction to military action by the Arabs to regain their 
land. They also represent a powerful bargaining group in 
any peace negotiation as well as very influential lobby 
inside Israel which cannot easily be ignored. 
The settlement organisation on the West Bank 
believe in their religious duty to settle what they see as 
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38 the historic homeland of Judaism. in Golan, it may be 
negotiable in return for Peace with Syria. And in Gaza 
Strip, there may be some chance that settlement, would be 
forfeited in Sinai. On the other hand the West Bank is 
unlikely to be returned to Jordan or the PLO because the 
pattern of Israeli settlements there makes any kind of 
39 political partition extremely difficult to implement. 
2.2 Civil-Military Relation After the Creation of the State 
of Israel : 
Since its establishment in 1948, the civil-military 
relation in Israel has a unique character. It has a 
professional, a political army under the institutionalized 
and objective control of the elected political authorities, 
imbued with the values of the civil culture-like the armies 
40 
of modern western countries. 
The close relationship between civil and military 
in Israel does not mean that it has transformed into a 
garrison state. The threat which is perceived from its 
neighbours compelled it for a closer-relationship between 
civilians and military establishments and thus its army 
became a 'citizen army'. The Israeli army does not reflect 
a class, social, ethnic or other group, but rather 
represents the entire community. Though Israeli army is run 
by a small professional group, it is based on universal 
obligation and is not a closed institution, but is open to 
41 the society around it. 
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Again, 'centrality of security' plays a vital role 
in military and political concept of national defence and 
made security a vitally important factor in the political 
system. Success in fulfilling security functions bedame 
the supreme test of the political leadership and the 
guarantee of political stability - so much so that Israeli 
foreign policy. As described by a disciple of Ben Gurion, 
Moshe Dayan that 'small nations do not have a foreign 
policy, they have defence policy'. Consequently, decisions 
on military actions were sometimes taken not only out of 
purely professional, military considerations, but as a 
reaction to domestic needs such as the fortifying of 
national morale, in response to political pressure 
groups, to release military tensions, or because the 
42 political leadership needed to demonstrate forcefulness. 
In addition to the political impact of the military, 
military also influenced many sectors of society. It has 
its influence on leadership and administrative styles, 
which is, in turn, reflected in work patterns, 
organisational procedures, interpersonal relations, 
semantic codes and terminology. Officers bring these 
values with them when they leave the IDF and start new 
careers in the public or private sector. This explains 
why the army can influence Israeli policy-making in the 
security field above and beyond the level usually 
acceptable in similar democracies. 
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The Israeli Defence Service Law also makes a great 
contribution for the public involvement in defence 
services. All the permanent residents who are Jews are 
obliged to serve even though not citizen of Israel. 
Military service in Israel indicates proximity to the 
supreme values of society, and the greater the 
contribution by an individual or group to the military, 
the stronger is the expression of his closeness to the 
centre. 
The 'Security' which is very important for the 
Israeli society, and which led the Israeli army to play a 
more dominant role, could be interpreted in many ways. The 
distinction between what falls within and what outside the 
security ambit is not an institutional one, but analytic 
between sectors. Not only is the army entrusted with 
carrying out security functions, there are also civilian 
institutions whose functions include security. It is not 
the wearing of uniform, nor working in an army camp, nor 
being subjected to the jurisdiction of military law that 
identifies those who deals with security; it is the 
political elite that decides what falls within the 
security sphere. And as that decision is made within the 
political system, it has become a topic for dispute 
between political groups, rather than between civilians on 
the one hand and armed forces on the other. David Ben 
Gurion, the first Israeli Prime Minister, described the 
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security in the analytical perception rather than the 
institutional one and wanted to expand the boundaries of 
security as much as possible. Shimon Peress, who was 
successively the Director General of the Ministry of 
Defence, the Deputy Minister and the Minister of Defence, 
described the security as : 
"The security of Israel implies immigration 
and it means settlement. Security includes 
control of the sea and the 
air Security is the development of 
scientific research and scientific aptitude 
in all disciplines - Physics, Chemistry, 
Biology and advanced technology. The 
security of Israel is the mobilization of 
our youth and the involvement of the people 
and its scholars in the pursuit of 
difficult and vital objectives 
settlement, defence and integration of the 
exiles.Security is not limited function but 
a multiple effort; it is like a 
high-tension cable, concentrating national 
energy, and using it to reinforce the 
nation's ability to survive. It is .both 
existing energy and potential energy." 
Thus Shimon Peress claimed that self-defence, like 
self-work, was an expression of the creation of a 'New 
Jew' and a new Jewish society. There are some areas in 
which role of military is relatively wide, between the 
civil and military sectors, which can be analysed both in 
terms of time and space. As regards time, there are 
para-military and post-military organisations and 
arrangements, for example, Gadna (Youth Battalions) and 
Hamishmar Haezrahi (Civil Defence), which recruits many 
45 people beyond the age of compulsory service. Another 
manifestation is the arrangement whereby senior officers 
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retiring from the army receive a year's leave during which 
they remain under military jurisdiction, but do not wear 
uniform and have no military function.The spatial 
dimension of the 'grey area' is shown in many 
semi-military activities. It is manifested by the frequent 
changes that the Israeli undergoes from being a civilian 
to being a soldier, as was vividly expressed by the 
aphorism coined by the former Chief of Staff Yadin: 'The 
Israeli citizen is a soldier on eleven months' annual 
leave' . Thus having developed a social system, IDF has 
developed an intricate and complex relationships with 
Israeli society on a personal, ideological and 
46 institutional level. 
However, there have been tvro types of military 
officers in post-independent era in Israeli politics. The 
first group was consisted of those officers-politician who 
belonged to the pre-state generation, when the military 
was still an instrument of the Yishuv political system 
(person like Dayan, Allen, Galili and Carmel, who 
established their reputations in both the underground 
military force and in Labour Socialist Politics). In the 
pre-state Yishuv period civil-military functions were 
combined. But after 1948 they have been functionally and 
organizationally separated. Thus depoliticization and 
nationalization of the IDF created a new group of officers 
and a new type of professional, civil oriented officers. 
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who were not involved in party politics before 1948. 
Rabin, Bar-her, Yariv, Lahat, Sharon, Pa'il and Geva are 
all products of the post-1948 generation, without having 
experience in pre-stateparty politics. The role of these 
two groups in Israeli politics was unsurpassed in two 
areas: The formulation and implementation of national 
strategy and security and in leading a peoples' reserve 
army successfully in two wars, (1956 and 1967). The 1973 
war further elevated the political assets of the military. 
Successive Arab-Israeli wars further enhanced the military 
position vis-a-vis the position of generals in Israel. For 
example, the reputation of General Ariel (Arik) Sharon, 
the conquerer of the Egyptian west bank of the canal, had 
grown proportionately to his stunning military success. 
Again, the reputation of Bar-Lev was also enhanced by his 
resumption of military duty during the Syrian-Egyptian 
surprise attuck. The position of General Yariv, as an 
advisor to the Chief of Staff and the Prime Minister, and 
his role as negotiator with the Egyptian Third Army, was 
also enhanced. But, on the other hand, the reputation of 
Dayan suffered to a great extent due to the fact that as a 
Defence Minister, he failed to alert the IDF and so 
prepared the military for the initiative, and above all, 
that he failed to prevent the all-but-catastrophic conduct 
47 
of the first days of the war. 
85 
Thus, the young retired military technocratic-
professional elite who knew well about the strategy 
security, were regarded as suitable for political tasks and 
,f 
to ably check the growing party nepotism. Thus if this state 
has to survive, it must produce thinking officers, one who 
was so far demonstrated the greates dedication to the 
public interest, as well as remarkable personal integrity, 
courage, and political consciousness. These qualities were 
taken seriously by the Israeli electorate which hoped that 
the retired officers would considerably contribute to 
reforming, rejuvenating, and invigorating Israel's 
petrified institutionalized political parties. For the 
Israelis this was the promise to be kept by war heroes. 
On the other hand, the rival political groups tried to 
build up their influence within the army by winning over 
the high command. In that way, the two main contending 
alliances of civilians and officers were crystallized. 
Inside each coalition civilian politicians were behind the 
political mobilization of generals, but they had to pay a 
double price when gaining the officers' support. Firstly, 
they had to reward individuals by supporting their 
professional advancement; secondly, they granted to the 
army itself a large degree of operational freedom and the 
capacity to influence its civilian counterparts in the 
widest sphere of national security. Thus the standing of 
the officer crops was raised and it became an equal partner 
with the political leadership. Since 1957, when the pattern 
86 
of 'second career' was introduced in IDF, hundreds of high 
ranking officers in their early fourties have been 
discharged from the army and entered the civilian work 
market (in the last decade alone, these have included 
approximately 100 officers of the rank of brigadier general 
or higher). Between the years 1949 and 1981, over 20 per 
cent of these officers entered into politics and till date 
. . 48 the majority of them are enjoying high party positions. 
2.3 Military Superiority : 
Israeli leaders believe that continued existence of 
Israel depends on its military superiority. A senior 
government official stated, "Our security rests in our 
49 
superiority". Therefore, Israelis believe that Israel 
will survive as long as it is strong. "Military becomes the 
centre of survival and solidarity in Israel. In 1948 Prime 
Minister and Minister of Defence David Ben-Gurion declared 
that the Haganah (an underground military organisation 
established in 1920) had shed its cladestine character and 
would Hitherto become the official army of the state of 
Israel. The official name of the Haganah was changed as 
"Zeva Haganable-Israel", Israel Defence Forces (IDF). In 
April 1948 the Haganah repulsed Iraqi, Syrian, and Arab 
armies and captured Tiberias and Jaffa. Thus Haganah was 
responsible for the military survival of the Jewish 
State.^° 
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Israel maintains one of the world's most 
professional armies and has a high status in Israel's 
society. Ben Gurion has stated that "the IDF is the only 
body in the nation which is beyond debate which does not 
have divisions and contradictions.... which is free from 
the malgnancy of fissures and fragmentation which the 
nation of Israel inherited". 
He tried to make the army a symbol of 
identification and glorification of a supreme value. He 
also claimed that is an innocent society the military can 
be and our army must be an educational instrument that 
should be improved and made strong. The army cannot fulfill 
its mission within Israel or outside world, without any 
52 proper military direction. The centrality of security, 
the Ministry of Defence has the status of super-ministry in 
Israel. 
The administration of che occupied territories was 
assumed by the ministry of defense, after the June war, and 
the autonomy of the defence ministry became more 
53 
significant than those of other ministries. By 1967 the 
fully mobilized army numbered over 250,000 (Some 11 to 12 
per cent of the population). About 60% of Israel financial 
resources both domestic and foreign were being channeled to 
54 Its security forces. The Tax payer pays for 70% of Israel 
defense outlays which comes to about 15 billion out of 7 
billion. This portion is considerably higher than the 
88 
percentage that NATO citizens spend on their own defence. 
Israel is the most militarized nation in the world as it 
spends 30% of its gross national product on defence. 
This concept of security devotes all the resources 
to war preparation. The Israelis believe in the ancient 
aphorism "who wishes for peace prepares for war", which 
explain why Israel would have to maintain large standing 
army. Israel has maintained a high degree of manpower 
mobilization for national security. This has to enabled 
Israel to become a regional military power. Resources 
played a dominant role in Israel's wartime efforts reserves 
participation constitute an important part of Israel's 
wartime military strength. 
Israel remains the world's most efficiently 
mobilized society. The strength of its army is consistently 
growing Israel is capable of deploying substantial army as 
in the October 1973 war, Israeli formation took less than 
48 hours to disengage from the Suez front and reinforce at 
the Golan front in an emergency. Since the 1974 IDF has 
been conscripting over 90% of all males. Another factor is 
the extension of the period of compulsory services and this 
happened three time during thirty years. 
An Israeli women serves less time than men, two 
year instead of three, in the IDF and few of them do 
reserve duty unlike men. Former chief of Yigael Yadin has 
89 
stated "the Israeli citizen is a soldier on eleven months 
58 
annual leave" . 
The Airforce and Armour represent 80% of Israel's 
military strength. The Israeli airforce one of the 
country's most important deterrents has always been a 
highly technical organisation and has become even more 
sophisticated in a process stimulated by the demanding 
59 
requirements of defence problems. 
The Israeli strategy was based on aerial attack as 
the main defense. Its Air force protected Israel's 
territory from the raiding Arab aircraft and provided air 
umbrella under which Israel's ground forces operated 
freely. Israeli superiority in the air was the key to its 
swift victory on land. Thus the IDF building emphasizes 
on the air force due to its operational flexibility and its 
vital role both in determine and in determining the outcome 
of a war. 
The concept of pre-emptive war and rataliatory 
strikes became essential ingredients of Israeli military 
policy following Prime Minister David Ben Gurion's concept 
of carrying the war into the enemy's territory. Israel 
was the first state to develop a official policy of 
retaliation. From 1951 the Israeli government had ordered 
reprisal raids, these reprisal operations clearly indicated 
expansion and aggressive character of Israel. 
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Israeli believes that the doctrine of pre-emptive 
retaliation is a way to protect Israel and punish anyone 
who attempt to inflict harm upon. Therefore, the Israeli 
have made clear that they would launch pre-emptive raids 
against anyone if Israel felt that its security is being 
threatened. Yossi Ben Ahaven the Director General of the 
Prime Minister's office has stated "Israel has acquired a 
reputation of not waiting until a potential danger becomes 
62 
an actual danger". Israel's military strategy had been 
based upon making full use of the element of surprise. 
Striking the Arabs before theybecome unified and powerful, 
taking the initiative in order to achieve a quick victory 
and concentrate as much power as possible. 
A key stone of Israel's security doctrine 
prescribes waging a short and a decisive war, short because 
Israeli society and economy can not afford long war and 
decisive because Israel can not afford defeat at the hands 
of the Arab. Israel's security doctrine for achieving these 
objective aims at prompt transfer of the battle to the Arab 
territory, this could be achieved by fostering 
6 3 
maneuverability and offensive capabilities. Therefore, 
the Israeli objective is to win a war with the minimum 
losses among civilian and military. Israel has one of 
the most developed programme for civil defence against 
different type of war in future; for instance, "in October 
1987 Israel organized a nation wide civil defence exercise 
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in which school children were shown how to use gas-mask 
and take other elementary precautions against a chemical 
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warfare attack. 
"The Israeli military doctrine has taken from the 
Bible which consider a religious duty.... the soldier of 
Israel are the soldier of God and their wars are his..." 
The Israeli soldiers are respected inside and outside 
Israel. In November 1982 PLO exchanged six Israeli 
prisioners soldier for 4400 Palestinians and Lebanese 
detained by Israel. 
In Israel not only army is entrusted with carrying 
out security but the civilian institutions also share the 
responsibility for maintaining security. Ben Gurion stated 
that "The security mission would not be performed 
exclusively by the army. Without settlement, without 
industry, without the education of the nation, without 
sympathy from other nations not even the army itself will 
secure the peace of the nation". 
The Prime Minister is the final arbiter in the 
matter of defense policy. The state's security has always 
rested in the hands of a small group within the cabinet : 
sometime two or three other minister selected by the Prime 
68 Minister on the basis of their political power. 
The chief of staff established a national security 
planning system within the General staff branch in 1969, 
which deals not only with the military aspect but also 
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with the broader range of national interest, including the 
political and economic aspect of security. Moshe Dayan the 
Defense Minister of Israel wanted to establish a unit for 
national security planning with in the civilian ministry 
of Defense. And his planning aimed at taking this wider 
function out of the hands of the army but consequently the 
responsibility for national security planning remained in 
the General Staff Branch. National Security Planning 
System within General Staff Branch was responsible for 
preparing plans for the developments of the IDF, working 
out methods for ascertaining and studying wide security 
needs, and carrying out research projects by experts in 
the concerned field. 
Thus the Israeli national security aims at the 
strengthening and development of the IDF, the development 
of broad security structure for Israel, the integration of 
Israel's resources to meet security needs, the development 
of security connection with other countries (especially 
70 the U.S.) and political agreement with the Arab States. 
There is no commander-in-chief in Israel's army, 
and IDF is headed by the Defense Minister and Chief of 
staff. The Ground forces command, a new headquarter was 
formed in 1983 to meet the increasing complexity of 
warfare, the need for complete integration in training and 
administration of all branches of the ground forces. 
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The IDF increased the number of tanks by 50%, 
artillery by 100% and armoured personel carrier fleet by 
800% in recent years, and in the occupied territories the 
border troops have been used as a para military forces in 
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case of civil unrest. 
Nuclear Capability : 
Nuclear deterrance adopted by Israel as an ingre-
dient of her security perception. In the Middle East 
Israel is the only state, seriously suspected of having 
created nuclear weapons of some sort or other. Israel 
claims that it would soon move to the stage of nuclear 
confrontation with its Arab adversaries. Moshe Dayan said 
in an interview on 26 August 1976 that "Israel must have a 
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nuclear option". At the same time Israel believes that 
Israeli nuclear capability would stabilized the Middle 
East. 
The introduction of nuclear weapons into the 
Israeli arsenal will give the Israeli public a sufficient 
feeling of security. Israel's atomic energy programme 
intended to cover within its system of blanket its 
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security also. In July 1981, when israel conducted the 
world's first pre-emptive strike against Iraqi nuclear 
reactor, the operation's purpose was to prevent any Arab 
state in the area from constructing nuclear reactors. 
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Continuing Access to Modern Arms and Economic Assistance 
frcMtt the United States : 
Israeli economy is still beset by the massive 
problem that emerged in the wake of 1973 war, and security 
of Israel remained insecure. Israel has managed to cope 
with the world's highest inflation rate. Israel would face 
serious problem on both economic and military procurement 
fronts without U.S. aid. Through financial support, US 
caused about 50% of the Israeli defence budget but even 
without financial support Israeli relies heavily as the 
74 transfer of major American weapon systems. 
For sometime the need for a powerful outside 
backer had recognized by Israeli leaders. As Menachen 
Begin recalled Ben Gurion used to say that it is vital to 
have a great power behind you if you are pursuing a policy 
75 that may lead to war. 
Since the establishment of the State, the security 
of Israel have been central theme of U.S. policy. The U.S. 
has maintained to provide support and keeping Israel 
stronger than any individual or as group of its Arab 
neighbours. 
According to point of view of U.S. an Israeli 
security is that "Israel should maintain military 
superiority over its Arab neighbours, the Arab changing 
their statusquo by force to help to prevent this 
superiority. Israel now maintains the strongest military 
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in the region. The prospects for survival of Israel will 
not depend upon power alone but on a change in her attitude 
of superiority and on a lasting reconciliation with the 
Arab. There can be no security for Israel until there is 
security for the whole Middle East region. 
In sum, Israel has managed its security affairs from 
a perceived sense of vulnerability in the 40 years. Israel 
came to existence in 1948 and led to the first Arab-Israeli 
confrontation, and later there were wars again in 1967, 
1973 and in Lebanon in 1982. These wars further entrenched 
Israeli power in the region and also allowed to expand in 
the name of security. These territorial expansions are 
enhancing Israel's security by increasing Arab in security. 
For instance, Israel has annexed the Golan Height, invaded 
Lebanon, daily violated the human rights of the Arab living 
in the occupied territories and also bombed the PLO 
headquarters in Tunisia. Thus, Israel's strength lies 
mostly in the physical military sense of power and Arab 
disunity because Arab unity in a direct threat to Israel 
that must be prevented. Despite deployment in the 
territories, attainment of strategic depth and thepeace 
treaty with Egypt, the centrality of security of Israeli 
life remains undiminished. 
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CHAPTER - III 
MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN U.S. AND ISRAEL 
3.1 The Strategic Importance of Israel for the United States • 
Though the U.S. foreign policy towards the West 
Asia is generally guided due to the presence of oil 
reserves and its strategic location etc. but the most 
important factor for US presence in the region is to 
support and ensure the existence of Israel as its close 
ally. Since the advent of Cold War till 1968, West Asia had 
strategic significance for United States mainly on four 
counts : (i) Presence of Israel in the region, (ii) 
presence of petroleum and its immense strategic 
significance for the US and its western allies, (iii) 
vulnerability of the region to Soviet influence and 
geographic contiguity of countries like Turkey, Iran and 
Afghanistan to Soviet Union, and (iv) strategic signifi-
cance of sea lanes of communications (SLOGS) like Suez 
Canal, Straits of Hormuz and Persian Gulf to counter Soviet 
presence in the Indian Ocean. 
In the beginning, American involvement in the 
region was only confined to trade, missionary education and 
health. The first major element of American interest in the 
region was introduced by the US Oil Companies during the 
inter-war period. The Second World War brought into focus 
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the strategic importance of petroleum and its by-products 
2 
as "foundations of the ability to fight a modern war". 
Further the Soviet presence in the region and her influence 
in countries like Iraq, Syria, South Yemen and Egypt also 
compelled US to play a more dominant role in the region. 
Under the Truman doctrine, containment of Soviet influence 
and the preservation of local conservative regimes also 
prompted United States to actively involve itself in the 
region. 
After the World War II, oil occupied strategic 
significance for the economic security and well-being of 
United States and other Western countries. In 1950 oil 
accounted for about 30 per cent of the combined energy 
requirements of North America, Western Europe and Japan. By 
3 
1973 the figure rose to the tune of about 5 3 per cent. By 
1979, 45 per cent of the United States, 55 per cent of the 
EEC's and 70 per cent of Japan's energy consumption was 
4 
through oil. During 1950 United States was world's largest 
producer of petroleum and in 1960 its dependence on oil 
import was 16 per cent which reached to 35 per cent by 1973 
when the first energy crisis surfaced. Subsequent years 
witnessed increased American dependence on oil import. Oil 
being crucial factor in US and Western countries economy 
and West Asian countries being the main source of oil, the 
region was and is undoubtedly of immense strategic 
significance for the United States. Any disruption in the 
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flow of oil from the West Asia could severely affect basic 
US economic and strategic interests. The US multinational 
oil companies operating in the region involved capital 
investments around $ 3.5 billion in 1974. The replacement 
value of US company investments in the Gulf oil industry 
was estimated at some $ 50 billion in 1972 and yearly 
income from these investments was equal to half of the US 
balance of payment deficit at that time. Thus the US had 
high economic stakes in the region. 
Another reason which made the West Asian region 
strategically more important for United States was Soviet 
naval presence in Western Indian Ocean in the wake of 
British withdrawal from the area by the close of 1960s. The 
American perceptions about Soviet manoeuvres become more 
entrenched as the Soviets gained foothold in Iraq, Ethopia 
and South Yemen. 
The importance of West Asia is realized by most of 
the presidents of the United States. President Eisenhower 
described it in 1951 as the world's most strategically 
7 important area. So said President Nixon after twenty years 
whereas President Reagan gave this region the "first 
priority" in his foreign policy formulation. 
The importance of Israel for the United States 
becomes more vulnerable because without the Israeli 
support, it was not possible for the United States to 
continue its naval presence in the Mediterranean. It was 
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this naval base from where US balanced both USSR and 
Eastern Europe. Further the deployment of SLBM, Polaris, 
poseidon and Trident system made the USSR vulnerable to the 
US attack. 
By having an edge over fleets in the Mediterranean 
sea United States can reinforce arms particularly aircrafts 
to land and air units fighting from the bases in the West 
Asia. United States can target almost entire West Asia from 
her military bases in Israel. United States even has 
developed some special weapons for Israeli use on the 
condition that the US would be provided with detailed 
information about their combat performance. Western 
countries also gained valuable information as a result of 
9 
Israeli capture of much advanced Soviet weaponry. 
Another reason which led the special relations 
between United States and Israel is the shared democratic 
traditions and values. There was a domestic American 
political consideration - namely, the existence of a 
strong, well organized and politically active pro-Israeli 
community in the United States, spearheaded by Jews but 
also including many non-Jews. Despite of all the burdens 
like economic, military, cultural and political, large 
numbers of American people in and out of government think 
that Israel can still serve as a useful ally for the United 
States. As Professor Spiegal of UCLA wrote in commentary in 
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June 1983; "The facts speak for themselves. Israel is a 
unique and impressive ally. It influences political 
development in its ovm area, causes the Soviet embrassment 
and military difficulties, facilities the evolution of 
American weapons, conveys lessons which can be learned only 
from combat experience, provides intelligence on the region 
and saves U.S. defence costs through innovations and 
modifications of US weaponry. Despite claims that Israel is 
a strain on the US treasury, the types of assistance it 
provides more than compensate for US aid". 
After the collapse of Iran as a US ally in the West 
Asia, Israel became the single US defence partner in the 
region. A partnership that is most likely to result 
eventually in Israel's playing an increasingly more 
important strategic role for the United States. Being the 
only reliable friend of United States, Israel possess the 
most sophisticated arms in the region. Israeli location for 
United States becomes more important in the sense that if 
Suez Canal is closed, it can provide easy access to Red Sea 
by land, thus can connect Red Sea with that of Mediterra-
nean Sea. The ideal strategic bases in Israel can be used 
for direct military intelligence, electronics warfare, 
reconnaissance, logistical support services and medical 
facilities. In addition, they are the most modern and 
advanced bases, stationing weapons found only in the US and 
the NATO armouries. It is Israel which may help USA by 
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providing information about the desert warfare and climate 
aspects of the West Asia and about the efficacy of the US 
weapons and their defects. •*" Forty five years of US -
Israeli friendship confirms that both the countries are 
important for each other. 
Besides all these geo-strategic and political 
importance of Israel for the United States there are some 
moral and humanitarian grounds on which Jewish people 
deserve sympathy. Like many other people, Americans also 
extended their sympathy to the Jews for their terrible 
holocaust. On a more palpable and observable plane, the 
United States has had a long tradition of sympathy for 
peoples striving for nationhood and independence generally 
and for persecuted peoples in particular, which inclined it 
to look with favour on the aspirations of Jewish 
nationalism. And while itis true that Jewish nationalism 
conflicted with Palestinian nationalism which might also be 
entitled to sympathy on this score, Americans have tended 
to give priority to the Jewish aspirations to national 
restoration because these aspirations still left room for 
the Palestinians to realize theirs, where as the 
Palestinians aspirations negated Israel's entirely at least 
until very recently. (Which is today realized by P.L.O.). 
/loreover, the Jewish claims received a far wider hearing 
because of the presence of millions of Jews in the United 
States, and encountered for greater receptivity because of 
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their association with the Biblical record and 
. . 12 prophecies. 
Again, like the United States, Israel is a nation 
of diverse immigrants who left inhospitable lands for new 
shores where they endeavored to build a new just and free 
society, and experimented in the process with new forms of 
human association. Also, the pioneering spirit that built 
Israel is reminiscent of America's youthful days, and its 
drive and accomplishments in the economic, social, 
scientific and military spheres have been strongly 
appreciated by an America dedicated to the cult of 
achievement and progress. 
Despite all these factors there is cJne important 
factor which is serving as a bridge between United States 
and Israel and have their impact on American politics and 
policy, is the Jewish presence in United States. Though 
they are a very small minority but they use their franchies 
more than the average for all Americans. Moreover, American 
Jews have been important financial contributors to election 
campaigns of favourably disposed candidates even in 
constituencies that do not have substantial numbers of 
Jewish voters and this have to enhance their political 
weight. 
It is not only US government which is providing 
financial help to Israel but US Jews also contributing a 
lot to the development of Israel. "There is hardly an 
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important educational, cultural, scientific or philan-
thropic institution in Israel today which is not supported 
in some significant way by American Jewish aid (as well as 
governmental) aid, including all the institutions of higher 
learning and research, the main museums, the Israel 
philharmonic orchestra, the Hadassah Medical Centre and 
other facilities, the Histadrut, almost the entire 
vocational school system, and seres of religious schools, 
orphanages, and culture and sports centres throughout the 
country". Not only this, US Jews also have been trying 
their best to bring scientists, artists, journalists, 
politicians, sports stars etc. to Israel. In recent years, 
the number of American Jewish tourists in Israel have 
exceeded over 200,000 annually. They not only spend money 
that is helpful to the Israeli economy but have also 
brought to the masses of Israelis an awareness of the ties 
between their country and the United States. 
3.2 U.S. Arms for Israel '• 
The evolution of U.S. arms supply to Israel could 
be seen in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its 
implications for U.S. objectives in the region. Moreover, 
Israel's geographic location, along with its military 
facilities, offers the United States a good base, should 
intervention in the Arabian Peninsula be necessary. 
Disappointed by the radical attitude of the Arabs and 
Soviet expansion in the region. President John F. Kennedy 
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started arms supply to Israel to a large extent. In 1962, a 
deal of $ 25 million was completed which included the Hawk 
missiles. In 1966, United States further supplied A-4 
Skyhawks. Parker T-Hart, president of the Middle East 
Institute, Washington D.C. and former U.S. Ambasador to 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait offered four reasons for 
the supply of major weaponry to Israel : 
(1) The introduction of more sophisticated conventional 
weaponry by the USSR into Egypt and Syria during 
the early 1960's. 
(2) The attemt by Nasser to form a unified command over 
eastern Arab armies in 1964 and the active effort 
by the USSR (and Nasser) to switch Jordan and 
Lebanon from Western to Soviet weaponry. 
(3) The increasing r'sluctance of Western European 
States such as France, West Germany, Belgium and 
Sweden to make new arms sales to Israel and suffer 
the Arab boycott or a break in Arab relations. All 
Western and Far Eastern arms sales to Israel ceased 
after the six day war. 
(4) The re-doubted efforts of the pro-Israel lobby in 
the United States, intended to bind the United 
States to Israel's supply needs as the USSR has 
17 been bound to Egypt' s 
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President Nixon said that Israel must possess 
sufficient military power to deter an attack. By sufficient 
power, he meant that as long as the threat of Arab attack 
remained direct and imminent, the military balance must be 
tipped in Israel's favour. "I support a policy that would 
give Israel a technical military margi to more than offset 
18 her hostile neighbour's numerical superiority". He added. 
After the June 1967 war. United States again 
started arms supply to Israel in response of the Soviet 
arms supply to Egypt and Syria. In 1968, on the request of 
Israel, Johnson-administration agreed for the sale of 50 
Phantom Jets and 25 additional Skyhawks to Israel. On the 
event of the 'War of attribution' , President Nixon said 
that United States was prepared to supply military 
equipment to friendly country like Israel for the safety of 
her people. 
United States provided to Israel new Phantom Jets 
that were fitted with a pod of Electronic Center Measures 
(ECMs) which could enable pilots to have warning when 
attacked by an enemy missile. POds that were capable of not 
only detecting but also diverting oncoming missiles were 
19 
also supplied. The U.S. administration also provided new 
version of Skyhawks bombers. The smaller and slower but 
highly manoeuvrable Skyhawks, reputed to be one of the best 
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allround tactical bombers in the world/ were fitted with 
ECM pods. With the help of these sophisticated aircrafts 
Israel was able to hit the Egyptian radar positions and 
thus enabling the Israeli pilots to have almost untramelled 
20 freedom in Egyptian air space. 
United States did not disclose officially about the 
arms supply to Israel during the war of attrition but 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in 
its publications entitled 'the Arms Trade with the Third 
world", claimed that the U.S. government had provided to 
Israel 18 additional Phantoms, 18 additional Skyhawks, 
Shrike air-to-surface missiles and Walleye glide bombs for 
use against the SAMs, alongwith M-60 main battle tanks, 
21 helicopters and other equipments. 
The successive governments in United States became 
very much keen on the survival and security of Israel. This 
was done through arming that country considerably and this 
has continued to be the main plank of her foreign policy. 
From 1947 to 1952 the U.S. supported Israel on almost all 
the issues of crucial interest to the Jewish state, U.S. 
became major arms supplier under the Kennedy and Johnson 
administration. After the 1967 war, Nixon's doctrine 
further qualified to her earlier stand. President Carter 
described Israel as an strategic asset to the U.S. 
According to President Reagan: 
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"Israel perhaps is the only remaining 
strategic asset in the region on which 
U.S. can truly rely . Only by full 
appreciation of the critical role, the 
state of Israel plays in our strategic 
calculus, can we build the foundation for 
thwarting Moscow's designs on territories 
and resources vital to our security and 
our national well-being." 
Jewish lobby in United States also put pressure on 
the U.S. administration for the supply of arms to Israel. 
On the eve of the election of 1972, president Nixon agreed 
to provide 42 F-4s and 82 A-4s planes to Israel for the 
23 purpose to enlist the suport of the American Jewry. 
Kissinger also supported U.S. arms supply to Israel and 
said that the "Soviets would have to learn that the 
position of their clients could not be improved through 
procrastination; the Arabs must not win with Soviet weapons 
24 
or they would become intractable". Thus Nixon 
administration agreed to provide limited arms - 80 
Sidewinder missiles and bomb-racks - to Israel. Israel was 
also assured of replacement of heavy equipment destroyed 
during the 1973 war. 
The National SEcurity Council and the Pentagon 
decided to provide "Nickel Grass" air craft to Israel. 
President Nixon also authorized shipments to Israel of 
material costing $ 825 million including transportation 
during 1973 war. Israeli forces were also provided some 
major items which included conventional munitions of many 
types - air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, artillery. 
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standard range of fighter aircraft ordinance, replacements 
for tanks, aircrafts, radios and other military equipment 
25 
which had been lost in action. At least 600 U.S. tanks 
valued at sum $ 250 million were sent to Israel during 1973 
war. During the war the U.S. also sent its high-flying 
strategic reconnaissance aircraft, the SR-71 over the 
Egyptian front. The information gathered by these aircrafts 
were a great help to the Israeli forces. 
Post 1973 period witnessed massive arms race in the 
West Asia vis-a-vis U.S. arms supply to Israel. As stated 
by the former Israel Defence Minister, Shimon Peres, 'the 
overall Israeli capability (upto mid 1976) compared with, 
the pre-war levels rose by about 30 per cent, its artillery 
by about 25 per cent, its Armoured Personnel Carriers 
invento-^ y by about 60 per cent, its combat planes by about 
27 15 per cent, and its war vassels by 45 per cent. 
Though the exact figure of U.S. arms transfer to Israel in 
post 1973 war is not available, however, according to SIPRI 
yearbook of 1978, the following munition subsequently were 
supplied to Israel, as follows : Raytheon AIM-7F, Sparrow 
Air-to-Air missiles, Raytheon AIM-97 side winder Air-to-Air 
missiles, Boeing - Vertol CH-47C Chinook Helicopter, "Dabur 
77" coastal patrol boats, Grumman E - 2C Airborne warning 
control system (AWACS), Mc Donnell - Douglas F - 15 A Eagle 
Fighter interceptor, Sikorsky HH-53C Elint Helicopter, 
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Lockheed KC-130H Tanker/Transport, Ford W'109 155-mm 
Howitzer, Ford M-113 AI Armoured car Mc Donnell - Douglas 
RGM-84 A Harpoon Shrike air-to-ground missiles, Sikorsky 
S-61R Helicopter amphibious transport, Mc Donnell - douglas 
28 TF-15 A Eagle Combat trainer. Again in 1975, Israel was 
provided with the F-15A Eagle fighter interceptor and in 
1976 AWACS aircraft was also promised. 
The rapid growth in American assistance to Israel 
can be seen that after the first three years of 1967 war, it 
was $ 40 million a year and in the next three years it 
averaged about $ 400 million nearly 28 per cent of her total 
defence expenditure and in 1974-75 it averaged about $ 1.5 
billion raising it to 42 per cent of her defence 
/•• 29 spendings. 
During the administration of Nixon and Ford United 
States extended a significant amount of arms and ammunition 
to Israel both on grant and sales basis. United States 
supplied arms to Israel even when there was no treaty about 
arms transfer between the two countries. Finally amendment 
in Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 finished the legal 
hinderence on arms sale and thus cleared the way for the 
massive U.S. arms supply to Israel. During the visit of 
Israeli Prime Minister Shamir and Defence Minister Arens to 
VVashington in November 1983, President Reagan signed an 
agreement on strategic co-operation. The accord provided for 
the creation of a Joint Committee to coordinate the military 
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efforts of Joint military exercises, the sharing of 
intelligence, and the stockpilling of American arms and 
30 
ammunition on Israeli territory. 
In May 1986 Israel Joined the U.S. Strategic Defence 
Initiative (SDI) programme with its potential for applying 
ATBM technology to countering the SSM challange to Israel. 
The Congress of United States also approved $ 180 million 
for Israel to develop a defensive system against short range 
missiles and thus making for the country's entry into what 
is popularly known as Star War programme. 
Even after Israel's consistent refuse to sign Non-
proliferation Treaty of inspection of its nuclear facility 
at Dimona by the International Atomic Energy Agency, United 
States never showed any intention to cut financial or 
. . 31 
military aid to Israel. Contrary to the U.S. policy co 
oppose nuclear proliferation, the Congress has purposely 
remained silent about Israel's nuclear capabilities despite 
the CIA's comprehensive report that Israel was producing 
32 
nuclear weapons. 
3.3 Israel's Nuclear Progrcunme : 
Israel has adopted a policy of nuclear deterrence 
for its security. Israel's nuclear research programme had 
started in 1959 and is suspected to have developed some sort 
of nuclear weapon. The importance of Israeli nuclear 
programme thus has been expressed by a senior General, "that 
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unless the country begins to plan now, Israel may not have a 
deterrence capability when the Middle East goes nuclear, and 
we shall find ourselves in the next war without the ability 
to defend our home front (against nuclear attack) or to win 
the battlefield".^-^ 
The need for the development of nuclear weapons was 
also emphasised by president Katzir in 1974 that, "It has 
been our intention to provide the potential for nuclear 
development. We now have that poential. We will defend this 
country with all possible means at hand. We have to develop 
34 
more powerful and new arms to protect ourselves". At the 
same time the nuclear option of some Arab states also 
aggravated the situation. Iraq, for example, initiated its 
nuclear and chemical programmes in the 1970s. Syria now is 
improving its missile delivery programme. Even non-Arab 
Iran's efforts to upgrade its nuclear related programmes are 
motivated, at least partially, by concerns about nuclear 
35 
capability. Israel has always refused to place its nuclear 
installations under fullscope safeguards and sign the N.P.T. 
Israelis believe that Israel can not afford to lose a war 
and still remain a viable nation and should gain nuclear 
capability. 
Nuclear weapons would provide Israel for the first 
time with the ability to threaten unacceptable punishment in 
relation to an Arab challenge to Israel's survival. 
Secondly, the sheer size of the punishment involved would 
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make it nearly certain that the Arabs would correctly asses 
the damage they might suffer should they attempt to 
challenge Israel's survival. 
Israeli nuclear programme is absolutely different 
from those of U.S.A., France or China. Israel had developed 
nuclear weapons for its need considering her geographical 
location, which is to be used against its neighbours in the 
West Asia. Israel does not need high-yield hydrogen bombs 
which would injure its own population if used against its 
immediate neighbours. It realised in the 1960s that it 
wanted tactical nuclear weaponry. This led to the 
development of nuclear shell fired from the 155 mm howitzer 
or from a naval gun. These shells contain a low-yield, two 
kiloton nuclear device, the ideal nuclear weapons for 
Israel. Israel may now possess 70 nuclear weapons stock-
piled and has also developed 100 short range (400 mile) 
Jericho - II missiles capable of carrying a nuclear 
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warhead. On the other hand, Israel did not want to see 
that any Arab country could possess a nuclear weapons or 
develop a nuclear reactor because Israel consider it a 
direct threat to its existence. As in July 1981 Israeli F-16 
fighter-bombers flew 650 miles to bomb the Iraqi nuclear 
plant outside Baghdad which was capable of producing a 
nuclear weapons within the next two decades. Since then, 
there are no Arab states with nuclear programmes which are 
likely to become even a minor threat to Israel. This policy 
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of Israel was also confirmed by Ariel Sharon that "declared 
principle in Israel's defence policy for the 1980's was its 
determination to prevent confrontationist states from access 
to the nuclear weapon", thus demanding a unique position for 
38 Israel in the region. The only Muslim country, Pakistan, 
has registered any genuine progress in nuclear sphere. 
Israel fear that Pakistan may transfer nuclear weapons to 
Arab countries which may endanger her security and chall-
enge its monopoly in the region. Israel has been thinking 
about to destroy Pakistani nuclear facility and has been 
urging India to help or facilitate such an action. New 
Delhi, however, has refused to cooperate with Israel in this 
39 
matter. 
Israel happens to be the only nuclear state in West 
Asia. So to deter Israel, Arab states developed chemical 
weapons and ballistic missiles. Six countries in West Asia 
have chemical weapons arsenals, e.g. Iraq, egypt, Syria, 
Libya, Iran and Israel. To counter these chemical and 
biological threats Israel has the World's most elaborate 
civil defence programmes. Israel has had a chemical weapons 
capability since the 1970's but it is currently believed to 
be increasing its stockpile of gas weapons. Her entire 
population is provided with gas masks and other chemical 
40 defensive equipment. Israel also produced air and 
purification systems on armored vehicles, respirator masks, 
protective clothing and personal treatment Kits in case of 
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injury. By these preventive measures Israel became one of 
the best prepared country against chemical or biological 
attacks, thereby, reducing the possibility of high 
casualities among their small population. The proliferation 
of nuclear and chemical weapons are creating tension in the 
region. As said by a senior officer of Israeli defence 
force, 'it has changed the rules of war in the Middle East'. 
The proliferation of missiles in the West Asia is 
causing a serious threat to the security of Israel. In 
the past wars between Israel and Arabs, only Israel had this 
capability but today about ten countries have ballistic 
missiles e.g. Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, 
Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen. The proliferation of 
missiles beings in the region in early 1980's following the 
Iran-Iraq war. 
The main problem created by missile proliferation in 
the region for Israel is that it has undermined Israeli air 
superiority and subjected pre-emptive strikes. Again the 
capability of missiles to deliver chemical and even nuclear 
weapons are supsetting the military balance in the region 
41 
which has long favoured the Israelis. For example, Syrian 
SS-21 missile is only two minutes away from Israel. In the 
Gulf War, Iraq attacked Israel by missle, namely, Al-Hussain 
and Al-Abbas which is matter of concern for Israel. Further 
in response to the recent missile proliferation in the 
region Israel has expanded its missile programme. It has 
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launched Ofek-1 in September 1988 and Ofek-2 experimental 
communications satellites in April 1990. Israel is also 
working in cooperation with America (who are funding 80 per 
cent of the cost) over an ambitious $ 200 million research 
effort to construct an anti-ballistic missile system, the 
Arrow. Israel has been also testing the 1400 km Jericho-II, 
42 the medium range ballistic missile. These Israeli missile 
development shows its intention to maintain its superiority 
over the Arab states. 
3.4 US EconcxQic and Military Assistance to Israel 
Before analysing the developments leading to Arab-
Israel conflict in October 1973 and US policy towards the 
conflict and the pattern of US-Israel relations in the 
post-October 1973 war period, it is worthwhile to analyse US 
economic assistance given to Israel between 1968 and 1980. 
American arms supplies to Israel will be analysed in 
sequence of events as they obtained in the region to 
ascertain strategic perspective. 
The U.S. economic and military assistance made 
available to Israel during 1968 to 1980 is shown in 
table 3.1 
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T a b l e 3 . 1 
US ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL 
1968 t o 1980 
($ m i l l i o n ) 
Year Total Economic Economic Military Mi l i t a ry Soviet Jews 
Aid Loans Grants Loans Grants Resettlanent 
Funds(a) 
1968 
1968 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
76.8 
121.7 
71.5 
600.8 
404.2 
467.3 
2570.7 
693.1 
2299.4 
1757.0 
1811.8 
4815.1 
1811.0 
SOURCE : The 
51.3 
36.1 
40.1 
55.5 
53.8 
59.4 
-
8.6 
239.4 
252.0 
266.8 
265.1 
261. 
Link 1 
0.5 
0.6 
0.4 
0.3 
50.4 
50.4 
50.4 
344.5 
475.0 
490.0 
525.0 
525.1 
525.0 
[Washington 
25.0 
85.0 
30.0 
545.0 
300.0 
307.5 
982.7 
200.0 
750.0 
500.0 
500.0 
2700.0 
500.0 
) December 
-
-
-
-
-
-
1500.0 
100.0 
750.0 
500.0 
500.0 
1300.0 
500.0 
1982, p. 
-
-
-
-
-
50.0 
36.5 
40.0 
15.0 
15.0 
20.0 
25.0 
25.0 
3. 
It is evident from the above table that American 
economic and military asistance to Israel was in the form of 
loans and grants. In 1968, Washington provided $ 76.8 
million worth of aid to Israel. Military component of this 
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aid was $ 25.0 million/ almost one third of the total aid. 
After the October 1973 war, the US assistance to Israel 
rose to $ 2,570.7 million thus registering substantial 
increase as compared to 1968. Of the total aid received by 
Israel from the United States in 1979, more than 90 per 
cent was military aid which was to the tune of $ 2482.7 
million. From then onward, the military assistance 
constituted the major Chunk of total aid provided by 
Washington to Israel. During 1979, Israel received an all 
time high aid to the tune of $ 4815.1 million of which 
military assistance was $ 4,000 million and the economic 
assistance was $ 815.1 million. 
Apart from these official amounts, the General 
Accounting Office, in a study entitled 'United States 
Economic Assistance for Israel' listed the additional aid : 
A $ 55 million Ashdod-based desalination project, $ 125 
million in loan guarantees from 1974 to 1975 for private 
U.S. financing of mortgages for low cost housing in Israel, 
more than $ 10 million in grants to the inter-governmental 
committee for European migration to help transport refugees 
to Israel; about $ 100 million to set up US-Israeli 
binational research foundations for industry, science and 
agriculture, etc. 
Apart from the official aid received by Israel from 
US, as shown in the table above, there were also private 
tax exempt transfers of money made by American citizens to 
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I s r a e l , e s t i m a t e d t o be a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 1.4 m i l l i o n 
44 
a n n u a l l y . B e s i d e s , t h e r e were n o n - a i d a c c o u n t s which 
i n c l u d e d e x p o r t - i m p o r t bank l o a n s , g r a n t s and c o n t r a c t s 
from t h e D e p a r t m e n t of Energy and M i l i t a r y C o n t r a c t s ; 
which d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e t h e p a r t of o f f i c i a l a i d a s shown 
i n t h e a b o v e t a b l e . 
P r o - I s r a e l i lobby i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a t t e m p t e d t o 
p r o j e c t I s r a e l a s a v a l u a b l e s t r a t e g i c a s s e t fo r 
s a f e g u a r d i n g American i n t e r e s t s i n West A s i a . The m i l i t a r y 
l e v e r a g e g a i n e d by I s r a e l d u r i n g t h e J u n e 1967 war was 
s k i l l f u l l y m a n i p u l a t e d by t h i s l o b b y i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s i n g 
t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l wisdom and p o l i t i c a l o r t h o d o x y of t h e 
i d e a s t h a t I s r a e l cou ld c o n t a i n S o v i e t e x p a n s i o n i n t h e 
wes t A s i a , p r o t e c t "modera te" Arab Regimes from t h r e a t s by 
45 
" r a d i c a l " f o r c e s , and m a i n t a i n r e g i o n a l s t a b i l i t y . 
Accord ing t o Rubenbe rg , " t h e s e m i s t a k e n a s s e s s m e n t s l e d t h e 
Nixon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o supp ly I s r a e l w i t h a l l t h e 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons i t d e s i r e d and t o p r o v i d e f u l l 
s u p p o r t f o r I s r a e l ' s r e g i o n a l p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s , w i t h o u t 
any e v a l u a t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e c o m p a t a b i l i t y of I s r a e l i and 
46 American i n t e r e s t s " . 
F r e d J . K h o u r i , an emien t e x p e r t on West A s i a , a l s o 
s u p p o r t R u b e n b e r g ' s a s s e s s m e n t , when he s a y s : "The Uni ted 
S t a t e s c r e a t e d such a s t r o n g m i l i t a r y f o r c e i n I s r a e l t h a t 
t h e r e was l i t t l e i n c e n t i v e t o make t h o s e major c o n c e s s i o n s 
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considered in Washington to be necessary for Peace with the 
Arabs. In addition, the more Israel was armed by the United 
States, the more dependent Arab states became on Soviet 
military and economic aid. In short, Israel's superior 
military power, and its resulting unwillingness to make the 
concessions needed for peace, made Israel more of a 
liability than an asset in preventing the spread of Soviet 
power and influence in the Middle East". In the wake of 
Soviet arms supplies to Egypt since early 1970, pro-Israeli 
lobby in United States mounted pressure on Nixon 
administration to make additiona arms supplies available to 
Israel. On 4 June 1970, eighty five senators, responding to 
pro-Israeli pressure, handed over a petition to Secretary 
of State Rogers demanding that Washington supply Israel 
with 125 additional fighter air craft like Skyhawks and 
48 Phantoms. In this regard, the Israeli Prime Minister, 
Golda Meir hedged in a speech before the Knesset wherein 
she repeatedly stressed that it was only on the basis of 
clarifications received from the United States regarding 
American "guarantees to maintain military balance" that 
Israel agreed to resume negotiations under Jarring 
49 Mission. 
The Israel Premier disclosed that she had received 
two significant pledges from United States : first, the 
assurance that the United States had obtained an agreement 
from Egypt and the Soviet Union to reform from changing the 
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military status quo by emplacing SAPIs or other 
installations in an agreed zone West of the Suez Canal 
ceasfire line; "second Washington agreed to supply Israel 
with military aid in all that concerns the maintenance of 
her security and balance of forces in the region". 
In August 1970, Israel acquired a $ 7 million 
package of arms equipment including anti-SAM electronic 
devices, strike missiles and cluster bomb units which were 
highly sophisticated and had not previously been provided 
to any foreign country, including the NATO allies. On 1 
September 1970, President Nixon agreed to sale Israel 
atleast eighteen additional F-4 Phaton jets, just 
immediately after the Senate had approved a military 
authorization bill that gave the President Virtually 
unlimited' authority to provide arms to Israel with US 
financing. 
In the backdrop of civil strife in Jordan in July-
August 1970 involving Palestinians and Jordanian forces, 
Israel extracted military concessions from Washington on 
the pretext of rescuing King Hussain of Jordan against 
Syrian or Soviet attack. Consequently on 17 September 1970, 
President Nixon authorized $ 500 million in military aid 
for Israel and also agreed to accelerate the delivery of 
previously promised F-4 Phatom aircraft. The period between 
September 1970 and September 1973 was "unremarkable" from 
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diplomatic stand point of view with regard to US-Israel 
relations. In Washington's view, the induction of sophis-
ticated American arms into Israel had made it 
"unchallengeable military might" in the region. In the 
later part of October 1970 when Israeli Prime Minister 
visited Washington in search of more aircraft and arms, she 
was assured of assistance worth $ 500 million and a 
52 favourable response to her arms request for 1S71. And in 
April 1971, the Nixon administration announced that the 
United States was supplying Israel with additional Phantoms 
53 
and considering a new request for more. 
During the administration of Nixon and Ford United 
States extended a significant amount of arms and ammunition 
to Israel both on grant and sales basis. United state 
supplied arms to Israel even when there was no treaty about 
arms transfer between the two countries. 
Even after Israel's consistent refuse to sign 
Non-Proliferation Treaty of inspection of its nuclear 
facility at Dimona by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, Unit'sd States never showed any intention to cut 
. 54 
financial or military aid to Isirael. 
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CHAPTER - IV 
WEST ASIA PEACE PROCESS t THE U.S. 
The situation in the Middle East continues to be 
unstable Israel refuses to withdraw from the occupied 
territories and to grant the Palestinians ther basic human 
rights including self-determination and the Arab remain 
reluctant to accept the existence of Israel as a legitimate 
entity. The Likud and Labour Parties agree that under no 
circumstances should their be an independent states on the 
West Bank and that whatever solution might be arrived at 
Israel will never withdraw fully to the boundaries it had 
before the 1967 war. The Middle East has been witness to a 
large number of peace proposals. This chapter takes a 
survey of some of the important proposals keeping in view 
the US perception of peace. 
4.1 Role of the U.N. T The Arab-Israeli issue has been in 
the hands of the U.N. even before the creation of Israel. 
The U.N. decision of Nov. 29, 1947 on the Partition of 
Palestine was founded on certain principles. The General 
Assembly with both Soviet and American support votes on 29 
November 1947 to Partition Palestine into a Jewish and an 
Arab State and for a International city of Jerusalem. The 
Partiton Resolution had recommended the creation of a 
Jewish State on 55% of the territory of Palestine and of an 
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Arab State on 42%. Besides/ it recommended the creation of 
an International Zone of Jerusalem and environs on the 
remaining 2%. The Israelis accepted the Partitioned 
Palestine. They had no reason to reject the Partition plan 
which gave them sovereignty over Arab territory and the 
Power to expoel and dispose. Although the Jewish Agency 
accepted the partition plan, it did not accept the proposed 
borders as final and Israel's declaration of independence 
avoided mentioning any boundaries. A state in part of 
Palestine was seen as a stage towards a larger stage when 
opportunity allowed. Ben Gurion urged fellow Jews to accept 
the U.N. Parition Plan, pointing out that arrangements are 
never final, "not with regard to the regime, not with 
regard to borders and not with regard to International 
agreements". The idea of Partition being a temporary 
expedition dated back to the first partition proposal of 
1937. When the Zionist congress had rejected partition on 
the ground that the Jews had an inalienable right to settle 
anywhere in Palestine, Ben Gurion had argued in favour of 
acceptance: "I see in the realisation of this plan 
particularly the decisive stage in the beginning of full 
redemption and the most wonderful level for the gradual 
4 
conquest of all of Palestine. 
The Arabs on their part rejected the partition on 
the ground that it violated the provisions of the U.N. 
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chater, the Principles on which the universal declaration 
of human rights were based, international law and practice 
and the right of a people to decide their own destiny. The 
only agreed upon an international formula for an 
Arab-Israeli peace that was contained in two U.N. Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Resolution 242 of the U.N. 
Security Council was passed after the 1967 war. It 
emphasises the withdrawal of Israeli forces from areas 
occupied in 1967 and requires that all states in the region 
to live with in secure and recognised boundries. 
Israel has pointed out that this resolution does 
not speak about Israelis withdrawal from all the 
territories that had come under its control during the 
1967 war and sne urges that it should provide a basis for a 
negotiated agreement rather than a final plan for 
settlement. Thus, Israel's attitude about 242 has been 
ambivalent. Politically, Israel accepted the resolution 
because it was premised on the recognition of Israel by the 
Arab States and implied ratificcation of its conquests in 
1948 and 1949. But territorially Israel rejected the 
resolution because it considered that the cease fire which 
it had observed since June 1967 was not intended to 
prepetuate Israel's occupation of its territory also. 
Israel wanted to retain some of them, in Particular, 
Jerusalem, Parts of West Bank and the Golan Heights. 
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Israel has repeatedly violated all U.N. reslutions caling 
for the restitution to the Palestine Arabs of their usurped 
rights and has refused to cooperate with U.N. agencies in 
the Middle East and to abide by many other U.N. 
resolutions. Israel has annexed Jerusalem and proclaimed to 
be its capital enforcing Israeli laws their. She, thus, 
challenges the U.N. which has given Jerusalem the status of 
an International city. 
It is clear that the U.N. does not possess the 
clear power or willingness to assert its authority and 
enforce compliance. The U.N. has been unable to solve 
either the Political or the humanitarian aspects of the 
Palestine problem. The U.N. has not able to solve the 
Palestinian refugees problem, Jerusalem problem, border 
problem...etc. As a matter of fact, the U.N. itself has 
weakend its own prestige by its unability to handle events 
in Palestine, thus encouraging Israel to disregard the 
world organization when she choses. The U.N. appears to 
have shelved the Palestine issue among its chronic 
problems. It now intervenes only when a border incident 
occurs or to vote for annual funds to maintain helpless 
people in refugee camps. 
4.2 The Rogers Plan : 
The four powers (US, USSR, Bratain and France) 
began their formal meetings, designed to contribute to a 
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Peaceful Settlement, in April 1969. Discussion between them 
continued throughout the summer and into the autumn, as did 
bilateral United States-Soviet Union discussions. But, 
despite their efforts, the four power talks produced no 
identifiable progress that could be translated into a 
viable agreement, and the bilateral talks accomplished 
little as well. It was in this context that, on 9 December 
1969, Secretary of State William Rogers outlined US policy 
and advanced specific proposals for peace between the 
United Arab Republic (Egypt) and Israel. The Rogers plan 
was the most detailed proposal dealing with the 
Arab-Israeli conflict the United States had advanced up to 
that time. Israel's response was strongly negative, and 
critical of both the procedural and substantive aspects of 
the plan. Israel preferred a US role dasigned to bring the 
parties together; Rogers believed in the utility of a 
broader role and a more detailed posture. Israel focussed 
on the desirability of direct negotiations achieve a 
durable peace based on a treaty arrived at without prior 
conditions. Rogers saw the United States playing a role 
because of its international responsibilities; and while it 
would not impose a settlement, it would seek to achieve 
peace, because that would be in the national interest of 
the United States. Israel's concerns were specific. 
The cabinet rejects these American proposals in 
that they : Prejudice the chances of establishing peace, 
disregard the essential need to determine and secure agreed 
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borders through the signing of peace treaties by direct 
negotiations, affect Israel's sovereign rights and security 
in the drafting of the resolutions concerning refugees and 
g 
the status of Jerusalem. 
Israel also spoke of appeasement of the Arab at 
Israel's expense, and Prime Minister Golda Meir articulated 
in detail her opposition to the plan in the Knesset on 29 
December 1969 : 
The proposals do not obligate the Arab states 
expressly to recognize Israel's sovereignty, they do not 
advocate the delineation of secure, recognized, and agreed 
borders by free negotiations between the parties, they do 
not obligate the Arab states effectively to put an end to 
terrorist activities from their territories. On the other 
hand, they involve a violation of Israel's sovereign rights 
in regard to Jeruslem and a danger to Israel's security in 
the proposed arrangement about the Arab refugees-. 
4.3 The European Stand : 
The European community foreign ministers met in 
November 1973 to consider the effects of the oil embargo 
and the appeal of the Netherlands, for help in the crisis 
it faced. The Foreign ministers called for a just peace in 
the Middle East through negotiations within the framework 
of the U.N. and declared themselves ready to do all in 
their power to help in the attainment of peace. They laid 
down four essential points : (1) Inadmissibility of 
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acquisition of territory by force (2) Termination of 
forcible occupation of Arab territories by Israel since 
1967, (3) Respect for the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, independence, and peaceful existence of every 
state in the region. (4) Recognition that in the 
establishment of a just and lasting peace account must be 
. . 9 taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. In 
London in June 1977 the European Council recognised that 
peace can come to the Middle East only when the legitimate 
rights of the Palestinian people to give effective 
expression to their national identity is translated into 
act. This should take into account the need for a homeland 
for the Palestinian people. They also pointed out that 
representatives of the Palestinian People must participate 
in the negotiations. 
On 13 June 1980 the nine countries of the European 
Economic community after a summit meeting in Venice issued 
the following statements on the Middle East : (1) The heads 
of states and ministers of foreign affairs., agreed that 
the growing tensions affecting this region constitute a 
serious danger and render a comprehensive solution to the 
Israeli-Arab conflict more necessary and pressing then ever 
(2) The nine-member-states of the European community 
consider that the traditional ties and common interests 
which link Europe to the Middle East oblige them to play a 
special role and now requires them to work in a more 
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concrete way towards peace. (3) All these countries in the 
area are entitled to live in peace within secure, 
recognised and guaranteed borders. (4) A just solution must 
be found to the Palestinian problem, which is not simply 
one of the refugees. (5) The achievement of these 
objectives requires the involvement and support of all 
parties concerned in the peace settlement... and the PLO 
which will have to be associated with the negotiations. (6) 
The nine stress that they will not accept any unilateral 
initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem, and 
that any agreement on the city's status should guarantee 
freedom of access for everyone to the holy places. (7) The 
nine stress the need for Israel to put an end to the 
territorial occupation which it has maintained since the 
conflict of 1967 as it has done for a part of the Sinai. 
They are deeply concerned that the Israeli settlements 
constitute a serious obstacle to the peace process in the 
Middle East. (8) Concerned as they are to put an end to 
violence, the nine countries also considered that the 
renunciation of force by all parties can create a climate 
of confidence in the area. (9) The nine have decided to 
make the necessary contacts with all parties concerned. 
The European plan showed with clarity the inability of 
Europe to take any decision displeasing to the United 
States. Western Europe's dependence on the U.S.A. for its 
security made its acceptance of American dictation in many 
other spheres virtually inevitable. The Venice declaration. 
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as it became known, provoked anger from the P.L.O. In a 
statement on 15, June 1980, the PLO said, criticised the 
statement as being largely a clear response to U.S. will 
and pressures, which are based on an attempt to impose U.S. 
hegemony upon the Arab region and to liquidate the 
Palestinian issue in the interests of US imperialism and 
12 Zionism. The European approach has been based on many 
previous statement and on U.N. resolutions 242 and 338. It 
sought to promote two principles : right to existence and 
the security of all states in the region including Israel 
and justice for all the people, which implied the 
recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian 
people. 
4.4 Geneva Conference : 
The first Arab Israeli peace conference opened in 
Geneva on December 21, 1973. The participants were Israel, 
Egypt, Jordan, the United States, the Soviet Union and the 
United Nation. Syria boycotted the meeting. The first round 
of the peace conference ended the following day with an 
agreement to begin talks on separating Israeli and Egyptian 
forces along the Suez Canal. Egypt and Israel signed a 
troop disengagement accord on January 18, 1974 and the 
troop withdrawal was completed on March 4. Meanwhile, 
efforts to negotiate a similar agreement between Israel and 
Syria continued. Syria and Israel signed a similar 
agreement on May 31. In early 1975, Kissinger sought 
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second-stage disengagement in the Sinai Desert, but after 
15 days of shutling between Egypt and Israel, he declared 
on March 23 that his efforts had failed. After the 
breakdown in the talks, Egypt formally requested a 
resumption of the full Geneva conference. But it became 
widely recognized that a propaganda battle at Geneva might 
degenerate into war and the Conference was indefinitely 
13 postponed. 
4.5 The Begin Plan : 
The plan was proposed by Israeli Prime Minister 
Manachem Begin. It was for the West Bank and Gaza strip. 
Begin proposed a twenty-six autonomy plan which he 
presented to the Knesset on 28 December 1977. The plan 
concerns the Palestinian Arabs, residents of the West Bank 
and the Gaza strip and represents the most recent Israeli 
position on borders, granting limited autonomy to the West 
Bank Palestinians but not sovereign rights. Israel would 
maintain a military presence for defence and public 
14 
order. The Begin government separated administration 
forom security. Administration of justice was to be under 
the supervision of local police force. While the Israeli 
government control would exist. Israeli armed forces were 
still to remain in charge of security. The inhabitants of 
the West Bank and Gaza were to be given control over their 
own affairs with the exception of the armed forces. Begin's 
proposal declared that Israel stood by its right and 
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claimed sovereignty over the West Bank and the Gaza 
15 district. These proposals were aimed at make the Israeli 
occupation permanent. Begin's autonomy plan was wholly 
unacceptable to the Palestinian population. And from the 
Arab point of view, Begin's plan never had a chance because 
his plan would not have touched the existing Israeli 
settlements or Israeli armed forces. 
4.6 The Camp David Accord : 
In 1967 Israel occupied the whole of the Sinai with the 
exception of the town of Bur-Fuad in the extreme northwest. 
The status quo at the end of 1967 was maintained until the 
October war of 1973 when Egypt retrieved some of the east 
bank of the Suez Canal. (Egypt had gained some 300 square 
miles of Israel-held Sinai territory on the east bank of 
the canal). Under an agreement in 1975 Israel was to 
withdraw east of the strategic Mountain passes of Gidi and 
Mitla and from part of the coast of theGulf of Suez. It 
was obvious that the Israeli leaders were preparing for 
peace with Egypt after the 1967 war and they had always 
been willing to pay a price, including the evacuation of 
Sinai so as to detach Egypt from its Arab brethern. King 
Hussein of JOrdan refered to President Nasser having told 
him after the 1967 war that Nasser had received clear 
indications that the Israelis would give back Sinai if he 
would make peace. President Nasser had refused. Nasser had 
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been willing to make peace with Israel only when all of the 
17 
occupied territories were returned. After the October 
1973 war. Former prime minister Yizhak RAbin said on 7 June 
1974 that Israel would strike for a non-belligerency pact 
with Egypt as the next step to a Middle East peace accord 
18 
and Israel would launch initiatives for peace with Egypt. 
On NOmvember 19, 1977 President Sadat went to 
Jerusalemon his historic mission. On 17 September 1978 
President Carter convened the historic Camp David summit 
with BEgin and Sadat. This summit started the process of 
Egypt-Israel peace talks. The Camp David framework for 
peace was to be followed by a peace treaty. The treaty was 
signed on Warch 26, 1979 by the then Israeli and Egyptian 
leaders Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat and was brokered by 
U.S. President Jimmy Carter. 
With Egypt removed from the militf.ry equation, 
Israeli security was vastly enhanced and this Presented 
Israel with a new freedom of action in its policy towards 
its other Arab neighbours. Egypt recognized the Jewish 
state because of Israeli evacuation from the Sinai 
Peninsula. Egypt had always had the strongest armed forces 
of the Arab States and the Egyptian front had represented 
an immediate military danger to Israel. After the signing 
of the peace treaty with Egypt, Israel's Knesset acted to 
annex all of Jerusalem including the Arab eastern section 
of the city. In December 1981 Israel declared the whole of 
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the city her permanent and undivided capital. Israel also 
19 annexed the Golan Heights. . With the completion of the 
Israeli troops withdrawal from the Sinai on 25 April 1982 
the Israeli southern front was made secure. In the same 
year, on 6 June, Israeli troops turned to their northern 
front by invading Lebanon. It was obvious that the Camp 
David Peace Treaty came as a big boon and a victory for 
Israel. It was considered as a strategic treaty as most of 
the Israeli leaders felt that peace with Egypt was a 
20 
strategic prize. Israeli Prime Minister had maintained that 
the 1979 peace agreement between Israel and Egypt remained 
21 the cornerstone of the Middle East peace process. He 
also added that, peace with Egypt was an acquisition which 
22 
was now part of Israel's international relations. This 
was also regarded in the United States as a great and 
histoic achievement. The Camp David accord resulted in the 
removal of Egypt from the Arab coalition and thereby 
eliminated at one time both the largest Arab army and a 
second front that had forced Israel to divide its forces. 
The agreement forced Israel to relinquish only Sinai which 
the Zionists had never considered part of Eretz Israel. So 
it was felt that with the camp David agreement. Israel need 
never worry about the other Arabs because without Egypt 
there can be no credible military threat to Israeli 
23 
security. To the rest of the Arab World, Camp David was 
and is an anathema. In any case, it was a body-blow to the 
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Arab world. Camp David did not contain a single reference 
to the Palestinian rights, to self-determination in the 
occupied territories and Jerusalem issue as well as the 
Golan Heights. Israel only offered limited autonomy to 
24 Palestinians as defined in the Camp David accords. Begin 
thus agreed to self-rule by residents of the West Bank and 
Gaza strip during negotiations on the future of those 
regions. The weakness of Camp David was that it has made no 
progress on the Palestinian problem and provided no 
25 
constraint on Israeli expansion into the West Bank regiont 
After signing the Camp David accords Begin announced on 
November 16/ 1979, a new plan of a more intensive 
colonization of the occupied Arab territory. This project 
called for the annual construction of 10,000 - 15,000 
26 housing units in the occupied territories. Since Camp 
David, Jewish settlements on the West Bank have more than 
tripled.^^. 
The U.S. armed forces also have the right of broad 
access to Egyptian military facilities. The Egyptian 
Israeli treaty of Peace stresses that the U.S. is ready to 
guarantee the observance of the treaty by expanding its 
military presence in the region. When the withdrawal of 
Israeli troops from the Sinai Peninsula was completed, the 
multinational peace keeping forces (MNF) were to be 
2R Stationed along the Israeli Egyptian border. The backbone 
of the multinational forces was formed by units of the 82nd 
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Airborne Division of the U.S. which is a part of the RDF 
(Rapid Deployment Force). They were deployed on the former 
Israeli Military bases of Eltam, Ezion and Sharm-Al-
29 . . . 
Shaikh. The Isaraeli occupation of the Sinai is thus 
replaced with American occupation and the U.S. received a 
bridgehead for direct interference in the affairs of the 
states of the Middle East and the surrounding area as 
happened during the Gulf war of 1991. 
In the light of the above facts, it appears that 
the Egypt-Israel agreements strengthened Israel's position 
both in the Middle East and in the world at large. Several 
states, for example, restored diplomatic ties with Israel. 
These include Cameron, Ivory coast, Zaire, Poland, Spain 
30 
and Turkey. Egypt felt that she could not keep aloof 
from escalation along the borders between Israel and any 
Arab Country, aloofness would finally destroy her 
credibility as a leader in the Arab world. Changes in 
Egyptian policy proved successful. After the 
assassination of President Anwar Sadat on 6 October 1981, 
Hosni mubark declared in plain terms that he intended to 
pursue the normalisation of relations with Israel and 
condemned the use of force in solving disputes and 
commited himself to the Camp David Treaty. The Egyptian 
regime believes that, the Arabs should reach a similar 
agreement with Israel through negotiation and that for the 
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31 Arabs a m i l i t a r y opt ion i s now i m p o s s i b l e . 
The Amman summit (December 1987) have freedom t o 
Arab s t a t e s t o i n d i v i d u a l l y r e s o t r e r e l a t i o n s with Egypt 
t h a t were served in 1979, fo l lowing i t s Camp David accords 
with I s r a e l . In May 1989 Egypt resumed i t s Arab League 
membership a f t e r a 10 year e s t r angemen t . Al l the Arab 
s t a t e s have resumed f u l l formal t i e s with Egypt in the 
32 l a s t two y e a r s . At p r e s e n t , Egypt i s r e e l i n g under a 
debt bu r tden of 44 b i l l i o n d o l l a r s and i t i s the second 
h i g h e s t r e c i p i e n t of U.S. a id a f t e r I s r a e l . Thus as long 
as Egypt remains heavi ly dependent on the U.S. for arms 
and economic a s s i s t a n c e i t seems u n l i k e l y t h a t any 
Egyptian l e a d e r w i l l scrap the t r e a t y and r i s k war with 
33 I s r a e l . 
In sum, from an Arab stand point, Sadat made most 
of the concessions. He did not gain any comitment to an 
eventual Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza 
strip or full Palestinian self-determination. The 
Israelis, however, promised to recognize the legitimite 
rights of the Palestinians and to permit the West Bank and 
Gaza Palestinians to participate in future negotiations on 
these areas. To ratify or reject a final agreement, and to 
halt temporarily new Israeli settlement on the West Bank. 
But Israel vetoed the participation of the PLO leaders in 
such negotiations or the establishment of a Palestinian 
x^l 
state. On these issues Israel's position has remained 
intact. Yet Israel gained a separate peace treaty with its 
strongest Arab neighbour. Thus, for a seemingly small 
investment Israel has gained a lot from Camp David as 
Jordan or Syria alone or together are too weak to wage war 
against it. Once the threat of war with Egypt had ended 
there would be no reason why Israel should return the 
34 Golan Heights to Syria. Hence, after the Camp David 
accords, the Arab's perception of a shared threat (shared 
hostility to Israel) was removed. Israel has repeatedly 
shown its ability to act at a level which the Arabs cannot 
cope with. 
4.7 The Fahd Plan : 
Saudi Arabia made public an eight-point peace 
proposal on August 9, 1981. Saudi crown Prince Fahd called 
on the U.S. to recognise the P.L.O. The Saudi Proposals 
were based on various U.N. General Assembly and security 
council resolutions. The Plan comprised eight points : 
1. The withdrawal of Israeli forces from all territories 
occupied in 1967. 
2. The dismanting of all Israeli settlements in those 
territories. 
3. Freedom of worship and the practice of religious rites 
for all religions in the holy places. 
15Z 
4. Reaffirmation of the right of the Palestinians to 
return to their homes and compensation for those who 
choose not to return. 
5. The West Bank and Gaza to be placed under U.N. 
supervisior for a transitional period not to exceed a 
few months. 
6. The establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem 
as its capital. 
7. The right of all countries in the region to live in 
peace. 
8. The U.N. or some of its member-nations to guarantee the 
36 implementation of these principles. 
The Israeli government rejected the proposals. PLO Leader 
Yasser Arafat on the other hand felt that the proposals 
offered a good beginning for a lasting peace in the Middle 
East. 
4.8 The Reagan Plan : 
It was not until 1982, when the Reagan plan was 
announced that the Jordanian option was given any serious 
38 
consideration by the US government. The Lebanese crisis 
preceeding the announcement of the Reagan Plan clearly 
demonstrated that lasting peace in West Asia could not be 
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achieved without the resolution of the Palestinian 
Problem.Since neither the US nor Israel was in favour of an 
independent Palestinian State in the West Bank, the Reagan 
Plan envisaged "Self government by the Palestinian in West 
Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan." The Israeli 
government rejected the plan, which also called for a total 
freeze on Israeli sattlements. The initial Arab response 
was not altogether discouraging, as became evident from the 
deliberations of the Arab Leaders at Fez. Following the Fez 
Summit, negotiations began between Yasser Arafat, the PLO 
Chairman, and King Hussain to evolve a Joint response to 
the Reagan Plan. Weakend by his ouster from Lebanon, Arafat 
seemed to be more receptive to the idea and an agreement 
with King Hussain appeared to he within reach, when the PLO 
Leader backed out because of opposition from the hardliners 
within his own organisation, supported by Syria. By April 
1983, the momentum generated by the Reagan Plan ran out of 
steam, with the break down in Hussain Arafat negotiations. 
Two years later, in 1985, another attempt was made 
by Hussain to revive the peace process in West Asia on the 
basis of the "Jordanian option". Realising that he could 
not negotiate with Israel without the support of Palestian 
representives - who could speak and act for the PLO - as 
such negotiations. Would require concessions and 
adjustments on borders, which he could not make on behalf 
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of the Palestinians, his strategy was to co-opt the 
Palestinians in the negotiating process. His inaugural 
address to the Seventeenth Session of the PNC in 1984, was 
an appeal to the mainstream of the PLO to join hands with 
Jordan for negotiating with Israel. To broaden his 
diplomatic initiatives, he re-established ties with Egypt 
the same year. 
The Hussain-Arafat declaration of February 1985, 
laying the foundation for a Jordian - Palestinian 
confederation in the context of the' Israeli 
- Jordanian Peace negotiations was thus an attempt by King 
Hussain to put the Peace Process back on the rails, by 
inlisting US support. He pleaded with the Reagan 
Administration, during his visit to Washington in May 1985 
to recognise that without the Participation of the PLO, no 
meaningful settlement of the Palestine Problem was 
possible. The Hussain-Arafat initiative provided the US 
with another opportunity to re-lanuch the Peace Process, 
but for a variety of reasons, the opportunity was lost, an 
in frustation, Hussain declared its end in February 1986. 
But it was the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and 
Gaza - begun in December 1987 - - which had, finally, 
Persuaded the King to sever links with the West Bank, as it 
had also threatened to marginalise the Palestinian 
leadership in the diaspora. The PLO was underpressure to 
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launch a political initiative in a bid to re-establish its 
Priinari' in the Palestine national movement. As the 
mtifadah continued, Hussain announced the decision on July 
31, 1988, to sever administrative and legal links with the 
West Bank, in a clear bid to put Palestinian destiny in 
their own hands and justifying his action in terms of the 
Rabat Summit resolution of 1974, and the subsequent Fez 
Summit Conference resolution of 1982, that agreed 
unanimously on the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. This was 
followed by the PNC meetig at Algiers on November 15, 1988, 
• 
that adopted (1) a declaration of independance for a 
Palestine state on the basis of the UN Partition Plan 
(1947); and (2) a Statement calling for an internationr1 
Conference on West Asia on the basis of the security 
Council Resolutions 942 and 338. In retrospect, the 
decisions taken at the Algiers meetings of the PNC, and 
Arafat's subsequent speech at the UN General Assembly at 
Geneva on December 13, 1988, and the Press Conference on 
the following day, unequivocally renouncing violence, went 
a long way in preparing the ground for the PLO-Israeli 
dialogue in 1993, although at that time these developments 
had very little immediate effect on the stalled peace 
39 
negotiations in West Asia. 
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4.9 The Hussain Plan : 
On February 11, 1985 King Hussain and Yasser Arafat 
signed an agreement calling for negotiations under the 
terms of U.N. resolutions. King Hussain traveled to 
Washington in Way 1985 and called the U.S. to renew its 
active involvement in the peace process. Hussain stated 
that high level U.S. officials should meet with a 
delegation of Jordanian and Palestinians among whom would 
be official representatives of the P.L.O. Following such a 
meeting, the P.L.O. would issue a statement oepnly 
embracing U.N. resolutions 242 and 338 and thereby 
40 implicity recognize Israel. According to Hussain's Plan 
the U.N. security council should convene an international 
conference. The participants would include the five 
permanent members of the security council. This conference 
would supervise direct negotiations among Jordan, Israel 
and Palestinians. Hussain said all these step would be 
needed to guarantee the involvement of all affected parties 
including the P.L.O. and Syria. He insisted on including 
P.L.O. officers in the U.S. - Jordanian-Palestiian meeting. 
U.S. officials said there was no reason for a preliminary 
meeting with a Jordanian - Palestinian delegation. The U.S. 
felt that it would hand Arafat a propaganda victory of 
overcoming Washington's refusal to deal with him.^ "'-
157 
4.10 The Shultz Plan : 
This plan was proposed by U.S. Secretary of State 
George Shultz in February 1988. It called for beginning the 
Peace Process with an international conference which will 
lead to direct talks between Israel and a Jordanian -
Palestinian delegation. It also called for implementing 
42 Palestinian self-rule in the occupied territories. The 
Plan envisaged the convening of an international 
conference, to be followed by talks on Palestinian autonomy 
in the Israeli - occupied Arab territories. Thus, it drew 
upon the provisions of the Camp David accords and the 
September 1982 Reagan Peace Plan. Both Israel and the PLO 
had rejected the Plan. 
4.11 Arafat's Peace Initiative : 
The Middle East Peace Plan proposed by PLO Chairman 
Yasser Arafat was submitted to the U.N. General Asembly 
meeting in its special session in Geneva. Arafat showed his 
willingness to participate in a dialogue with Israel about 
the occupied territories (the West Bank and Gaza strip). 
It implicitly recognised Israel and its right to eixst. The 
Palestinian peace proposal had come after Arafat's 
Proclamation of an independent homeland in the Isaraeli 
occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza strip with 
Jerusalem as its capital on 15 November 1988 at Algeria. 
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Arafat declared that he would be willing to accept all U.N, 
resolutions, including Resolution 242 which recognizes 
Israel's right to exist, in exchange for PLO participation 
in the peace conference. The PLO announced its rejection of 
terrorism in all forms including state terrorism, and made 
a distinction between resistance to foreign occupation and 
colonialism and terrorism. The PLO had also given an 
undertaking about the security of Israel. On December 14, 
1988 Arafat had stated 'Self determination means survival 
for the Palestinians, and our survival does not destory the 
44 
survival of the Israelis". After Arafat's proclamation of 
an independent Palestinian state, over 100 countries had 
coferred recognition on that yet-to-be formed state. These 
countries included the then Soviet Union and China the the 
countries of the non-aligned movement. The P.L.O. was given 
international recognition, and the Palestinian state was 
recognised. Arafat had said he was ready to meet with 
Yitzhak Shamir, the Israeli Premier, or any other Israeli 
official who recognizes the Palestinian people's legitimate 
rights and called for a distinction between terrorism and 
45 legitimate struggle for national freedom. Yitzhak Shamir 
rejected the call stating that Israel would not give the 
Arab's one inch of land. Israel has opposed the 
establishment of a Palestinian state in the Gaza strip or 
in the area between Israel and Jordan and said that it 
would not conduct negotiations with the P.L.O. 
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4.12 The Baker Plan : 
This peace, plan was proposed by U.S Secretary of 
state James Baker in April 1989. His five-point plan calls 
for : a comprehensive settlement based on U.N. resolutions 
242 and 338; direct negotiations; a transitional period 
between negotiations and the final settlement. He envisaged 
no permanent Israeli control of the territories nor an 
independent Palestinian state, but self-government for 
47 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Baker focussed 
not on a master Plan or grand design but on a more modest 
and subtle effort to achieve direct negotiations between 
the parties concerned with the conflict. In the Palestinian 
eyes, what the Americans were trying to do was to take the 
sting out of their revolt and get them to accept an 
autonomy within overall Israeli control. This was not 
acceptable to them. The Americans Peace initiatives are 
largely based on the moribund 1978 camp David Plan calling 
for an interim period of Palestinian autonomy. The U.S. has 
continued to view the camp David Peace treaty approach as 
valid for the ultimate resolutions of the conflict and 
preferable to any suggestion or probable alternative. 
4.13 The Mubarak Plan : 
President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in September 1989 
Presented an official Peace plan of his own. The key 
Egyptian points called for free elections under 
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international supervision to be held in the occupied 
territories, including East Jerusalem and for Israel to 
give up land for peace and to accept as negotiators two 
Palestinian activists that Israel had deported from the 
occupied territories. This point was designed to reassure 
the P.L.O. that the Palestinian delegation would not be 
exclusively composed of delegates from the occupied 
49 territories. 
Mubarak did not specifically mentioned either the 
P.L.O. or a Palestinian State. But he stipulated that 
preparations for the elections be made by a joint 
Israel-Palestinian committee» He also required the 
Participation of East Jerusalem residents as voters and 
candidates/ the commitment of Israel to a final-status 
agrument based on "territory for Peace" and a Prohibition 
on further Israeli Settlements in the occupied territories. 
When Labour Leaders Proposed cabinet acceptance of 
Mubarak's plan in early October 1989, the nation was 
defeated on a tie vote. The PLO appeared upset by 
Mubarak's absence of specific references to Palestinian 
statehood. The Mubarak peace plan did not represent a 
complete proposal, but represented a means of getting the 
dialogue established. 
4.14. Madrid Peace Conference : 
The Arab-Israeli peace conference opened in Madrid 
on 30 October 1991. The participants were Israel, Egypt, 
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Jordan, Lebanon, Palestinians, the United States, the 
Soviet Union, Egypt and the Arab Gulf states as observers. 
The Arabs had agreed to attend the conference without any 
preconditions. Only Israel arrived in Madrid with its 
preconditions. Tel Aviv did not want to negotiate with any 
member of the P.L.O. or any Palestinians from East 
Jerusalem. Shamir objected to Palestinians from East 
Jerusalem on the grounds that Jerusalem must remain 
Israel's united capital. Secondly, the Soviet Union must 
reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel before the 
opening session of the conference. In return Palestinians 
agreed on Israel's conditions and the then Soviet Union 
restored diplomatic ties with Israel on 18 October 1991. 
To bring Israel to the peace conference that Bush 
administration made several commitments in the shape of 
understandings between Israel and the U.S. Washington and 
Tel Aviv agreed that Israel was not obliged to accept the 
principle of exchanging land for peace. They would also not 
allow a paralle peace process in the U.N. Security 
Council. There was thus no U.N. observer in the opening 
session of the conference at Madrid. The United States and 
Israel objected to the use of the word "International" at 
the Madrid Peace Conference where 5,000 press badges were 
printed for the conference. The American and Israeli 
governments had a longstanding objection to any "Inter-
national" conference in the Middle East because Israel has 
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feared that it would be isolated in such a forum. Israeli 
Prime Minister Shamir said on the eve of the historic 
Middle East conference that Israel had no intention of 
52 giving up land as part of a peace agreement. 
Israeli government is expected to try in negotia-
tions over the next years to hold on to as many powers as 
possible over the land, people, water and resources in the 
occupied territories. Therefore, this stage of the 
negotiations could take years during which it is feared 
that over a million Jews will have been settled in Israel 
and the occupied territories. Israel is trying to engage in 
direct and separate talks with each Arab Party unfettered 
by pledges to reach a compromise. This is why Israel 
insits on direct negotiations. George Bush took a lowkey 
approach when he said "I do not want to get people's hopes 
too high because there is a long, long way to go before we 
have the making of, or have an agreement for peace in that 
troubled corner of the world. The Middle East".^ "^  
On the eve of the Madrid Peace Conference the 
Israelis inaugurated a new settlement called Kela in the 
Goland Heights, vowing never to return the disputed plateau 
to Syria. That appeared as a provocation for Syria.^^ 
Meanwhile, Lebanon appeared to skip back from a threat to 
boycott the talks after the Israelis bombed targets in 
southern Lebanon. On the eve of the so-called Middle East 
peace conference, Israel sent four F-15 warplanes into 
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Iraqi airspace on October 4, 1991. The planes entered Iraqi 
air space from Jordan and Syria and fiew over Saudi Arabia 
on their way home. By that action Israel appeared to be 
telling the Arabs and the World that it is so intransigent 
that it does not need peace.^^ Israel also used the 
conference to promote tourism. They used their office in 
Madrid to distribute coloured brochures inviting tourists 
complete with a map showing the country 'including the 
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occupied territories. The Madrid conference had no power 
to make decisions and was not used as a forum for appeals 
or discussions. The first round of the peace conference 
ended with an agreement to begin talks in Washington. 
This is the first time since 1948 that an official 
Israeli delegation met a Palestinian one. Jordan, Syria, 
Lebanon, the P.L.O all want the same thing : the return of 
Israeli-occupied territory. Egypt has already got back the 
Sinai and so, it was present at Madrid only as an observer. 
A survey of the peace proposals reveals two 
important issues : One relates to Israeli own perception of 
its security needs and two the manner in which this clashes 
with Arab perception of Israel. In the Arab perception, 
Israel's policies look like a war scenario. Israel's press, 
the debates of its leaders in the Knesset, their speeches 
and deeds, their history of aggression, their continuing 
threat to the Arab World their annexation of Arab Lands, 
their disregard for the human rights of the Arabs already 
under t h e i r cont ro l , a l l become manifestatio of a negat ive 
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image of Israel. They all indicate to the Arabs that 
Israel does not want peace. Soon after the 1967 cease-fire. 
Moshe Dayan was reported to have said that Isarael, should 
not give back the Gaza strip to Egypt or the Western Part 
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of Jordan to King Hussain. Rabbi Z. Kook took a more 
adamant stand that the Torah Forbade Israel to surrender 
even one inch of our liberated land. 
The Arabs accuse Israel of wanting negotiatios only 
to dampen the heat of what is fast becoming an exlosive 
situation in the Middle East. Negotiations can be dragged 
on for 20 years of more. Why should the Israelis make 
haste? They ocupy the lands In a speech to the Likud on 
18 May 1989, Yitzhak Shamir expressed the Israeli desire to 
6 2 
retain the occupied land. For this the need to acquire 
power remained a predominant concern. Ben Gurion had said 
that Israel understood peace only through power. The only 
way to convince the Arabs about peace was to show them the 
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strength of Israel. 
Israel's concern about its power equation was 
64 
reteriated by Golda Meir. Early in 1975 Dr. Kissinger 
complained to friends about this Israeli attitude.He said 
"I ask Rabin to make concessions and he says he cannot 
because Israel is weak, so I give him more arms and he says 
he does not need to make concessions because Israel is 
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strong.^^ All Israeli governents have believed in peace 
through security. Israel believed that "Security without 
peace was psace but peace without security was no peace at 
all."^^ 
After the 1973 war, there was a growing acceptance 
in the Arab world of the existance of Israel as a 
permanent feature on the Middle Eastern scene. Direct face 
to face negotiations with the Arabs have been an Israeli 
objective for years after the June war of 1967. Israel 
believes that the Arabs would come to terms only if 
compelled to do so by the threat or use of superior 
military power. Israeli leaders want a comrehensive and 
favourable peace settlement that must be achieved by direct 
negotiations and without regard to U.N. resolutions, as it 
does not accept the existance of a separate state of 
C 1 
Palestine. It wants a solution to the Palestinian problem 
/TO 
tobe found east of the Jordan river (Jordan). 
4.15 Israel—Palestine Peace Accord : 
No doubt, it is due to the US efforts that Arab and 
Israel have been brought on the negotiating tables for the 
first time in the history of VJest Asia.The US wants some 
kind of sattlement between Israel and moderate Arab natios 
Partly, because Israel has lost its strategic relevance as 
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US has got its foothold in other Arabian nations and, 
Partly, US would not be able to grant economic aid to 
Israel as generously as it did during the cold war period 
due to its own deteriorating economic conditions. 
The West Asian Peace Process starting from the 
Madrid conference, (October 30 - November 31, 1991) is a 
landmark for Arab and Israeli delegates met together for 
the first time to settle their disputes. The US President, 
Bush has asked Israelis to return the occupied territories 
and observe UN resolution 242 and 338 to maintain Peace in 
the region. However, no positive result has been achieved, 
so' far as dispute has to be settled by the contending 
parties themselves without the direct involvement of majro 
powers. 
The settlement of Arab-Israeli dispute can be come 
only by reaching on some compromise. The Israel Prime 
Minister, Yatzik Rabin, has showed willingness to return 
much of Nest Bank, but retain the Jordan valley as well as 
half of Gaza and all the Golan Heights .Rabin had agred to 
grant autonomy to begin with and has promised to allow 
general elections to be held in occupied territories while 
retaining controle of foreign policy, defence and security. 
Moderate Palestinians are willing to accept the idea of 
limited self-rule in West Bank and Gaza as interim step on 
the way to statehood, whereas radicals want complete 
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independence. It shows division of Palestinians on the 
question of settlement. But due to the U.S. effort a 
historic peace agreement was signed by Israel and the 
Palestinian Liberation organisation (P.L.O.) in Washington 
on September 13/ 1993, outlining a plan for Palestinian 
self-rule in the occupied territories. The Accord, 
described by some enthusiasts as "a modern miracle" is a 
political watershed the importance of which it would be 
wrong to minimise. It marked the dawn of the long-awaited 
era of peace in a conflict stricken region known for 
endless clashes between Arabs and Jews. It is "a conceptual 
breakthrough" and signals the success of quiet, patient 
diplomacy and recognition of realities. 
Life ong enemies, Yasser Arafat and Israeli leaders 
suddenly become friends and shock hands after signing a 
"Declaration ot Principles" which is expected to end the 
decades of enemity between Israelis and Jews and change the 
political landscape of West Asia. 
Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon peres and a P.L.O. 
official, Mr. Mohamoud Abbas (Abu Mezan) signed the 
document, US President Bill Clinton hosted the event. The 
notable dignitaries who witnessed the ceremony were Israeli 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, 
US Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Russian 
Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. 
168 
President Clinton made an appropriate observation on 
the occasion: "Today we bear witness to an extraordinary 
event in one of history's defining moments". He said/ 
"This bold new venture, this brave gamble that the future 
can be better than the past, must endure. 
Israeli Prime Minister Rabin called upon both sides 
to move to ballots from bullets, from guns to shovels.He 
pledged to work for a comprehensive peace for all. The PLO 
official Mahamoud Abbas, commented: "We have come to this 
point because we believe that peaceful co-existence and 
cooperation are the only means of reaching understanding 
and for realising, the hopes of Palestinians and the 
Israelis." 
4.16 Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty : 
The Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty, signed on 
October 26, 1994, twenty years after the failure of 
Jordan's efforts to have a disengagement agreement with 
Israel - in October 1974, marks the end of Jordan's long 
Odyssey for peace with an enemy that had not only occupied 
2,200 square miles of its territory but also threatened its 
very survival as a distinct political entity. During the 
intervening years, a Sea change has taken place in the 
Politics of West Asia, with corresponding fluctuations in 
Jordan's relations with Israel as well as in its position 
in the Arab World. 
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The failure of Jordan's efforts for a disengagement 
agreement with Israel, supported by the U.S. following the 
Egyptian-Israeli and Syrian Israeli disengagement agreement 
of 1973 and 1974 respectively - was an indication of low 
priority accorded to Jordan in Israel's foreign Policy in 
1974. It is just a coincidence that, as in 1994, Yitzhak 
Rabin was the Prime Minister of Israel in 1974. When 
secretary of State Henry Kissinger was trying to put 
pressure on Israel for agreeing to start negotiations with 
Jordan for a disengagement agreement, Rabin reacted by 
making statements in Public denying the urgency of the 
69 Jordan problem, as he attached more importance to the 
resumption of negotiations with Egypt for a second 
agreement.Twenty years later, Prime Minister Rabin signed 
the peace treaty with king Hussain of Jordan, ending 46 
years of Public enmity, and ushering in a new era in 
Israeli-Jordanian relatios. It will also hopefully, 
preserve the integrity of the Hashemiti Kingdom. 
The six-day War of 1967 had, no doubt, resulted in 
territorial losses for Egypt, Syria and Jordan, but for 
Jordan, the redrawing of territorial boundaries by the 
force of Israeli arms had graver political consequences 
which were directly related to its demographic composition 
and territorial dispositions. The establishment of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in April 1949, after the 
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unilateral annexation of the Arab part of Palestine - the 
territories to the West of the Jordan river, occupied by 
the forces of the Arab Legion in the course of the 
Palestine War to the Kingdom of Trans Jordan, on December 
1, 1948, led to the doubling of the Kingdom's population. 
Moreover, it brought under direct Hashemite rule the 
Palestinians living in the West Bank. In addition Jordan 
had to shelter about 4,00,000 Arab refugree from other 
parts of Palestine - consiquent upon the establishment of 
the state of Israel - to most of whom it offered Jordanian 
citizenship. The occupation of the West Bank territories 
by Israel during the 1967 War led to a fresh exodus of 
Palestinian refugees to Jordan, the cumulative effect of 
which was that the Palestinians constituted nearly two 
thirds of the Jordanian population by the end of the 1960s. 
The addition of the Palestinian population affected the 
Hashemite Kingdom in two ways, the destitute refugees who 
fled from the Israeli occupied territories were critical of 
not only Israel and Western States (especially Britain and 
the US) for all their sufferings, but also the Jordanian 
government which was looked upon a puppet of the Western 
Powers because of the pro-West Orientation in Jordan's 
foreign Policy. This section of the Jordanian population 
provided the bases for the recruitment of the fedayeen -
the guerrilla groups influenced by radical idoolocjios and 
171 
totally opposed to any negotiated settlement with Israel. 
On the other hand, the Palestinians living in the West 
Bank, who were better educated and more articulate than the 
original inhabitants of TransJordan, resented the poitical 
domination of the latter. As a result, there was rapid 
growth in articulate opposition to the government. One of 
the aims of King Hussain's foreign Policy was to evolve a 
strategy that would secure his Kingdom from an 
"expansionist" Israel, while at the same time, satisfying 
Palestinian aspirations, albeit within the political 
framework of the Jordanian state. 
Jordanian Politics and foreign Policy thus became 
inextricably interwined with the fate of the Palestinians, 
and the larger issue of Palestinian nationalism. So long as 
Jordan was in effective controle of the West Bank -between 
1948 and June 1967 it could resonably claim to speak for 
the Palestinian living there, in International fora, and 
in dealing with Israel. But the occupation of the West Bank 
by Israel in (1967) changed all that, although King Hussain 
was reluctant to admit this, till 1988. OPening the 
Seventeenth session of the Palestine National council on 
November 22, 1984, King Hussain spoke of Jordanian 
Palestine relations in the following vein : 
"Perhaps.... the natural starting point would be to 
emphasise the special relationship which ties Jordan to 
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Palestine, a relationship forged by purely objective 
factors of history, geography and demography, which have 
placed the two brotherly countries and peoples, since the 
begining of this century in the same beat of suffering and 
hope of interest and harm, of history and destiny. The 
particularity of our relationship has made the Palestinian 
question a daily and central question in our lives and a 
71 basis of our defence, foreign and development Policies." 
King Hussain was right, because the Jordanian search 
for peace - Jordan had been secretly negotiating with 
Israel right from 1967 - required the definition of not 
only Jordan's relationship with Israel but also its 
relationship with the Palestinian people, particularly,with 
the Palestine Liberation organisation (PLO), as it was 
emerging, after the 1967 war, as the chief articulater of 
Palestinian dreams King Hussain's dilemma - in fact, 
Jordan's dilemma - was that the relationship between the 
PLO and the Hashemite kingdom has ben far from smooth, 
which denied him the legitimacy to speak for the 
Palestinians, especially after 1970. 
The decade following the 1967 War seen significant 
changes in Arab coalitional politics. The defeat in the war 
had pulverised the existing Arab order.In the Post-mortem 
of the causes of defeat, the radical regimes in Egypt stood 
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discredited; Nasser became the fallen hero. There was 
disillusionment with his brand of Pan-Arabism. An 
alternative brand of radicalism was being projected by the 
Palestine movement that threatened to destabilise the 
existing order. The established regimes, therefore, decided 
72 to close ranks against the common "enemy" from withm. 
But it fell on King Hussain to accomplish the task of 
crushing the movement. The Palestinians had virtually 
created a state within the state of Jordan which, if 
unchecked, could lead to the disintegration of the 
Jordanian Kingdom. Moreover, the Palestinian militants 
(fedayeens) had turned Jordan into a sanctuary for raids 
against Israel, with the consequent threats of retaliatory 
Punitive actions by Israel. This, was the last thing king 
Hussain had wanted.The "Black September" (1970) massacre of 
the Palestinians by the forces of King Hussain had broken 
the back - at least temporarily - of the new radical 
Palestine movement, led by the PLO.While the mayhem 
continued, Nasser looked the other way. For the fight had 
not been Jordan's alone; all the Arab states, conservative 
as well as radical (with the exception of the Ba'athist 
regime in Syria), had sanctioned Jordan's efforts by July 
1971, there was almost complete elimination of the 
fedayeen as an organised force in Jordan. Although the 
problem of the fedayeen presence in Jordan was thus 
174 
resolved by the force of arms, a new issue emerged in 
Jordanian - Palestinian relations. This related to the 
question of legitimately representing the Palestians in 
international negotiations concerning the future status of 
the Holy Land. 
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* * * * * * 
C O N C L U S I O N 
Security is the central problem of Israel's 
existence, it has high status in Israel's society and the 
large amount of resources are allocated to it. Before the 
creation of Israel there was a civil war like situation in 
Palestine. When the State of Israel establish, it imme-
diately fought a regular war against the neighbouring Arab 
States. Israel won the war, but victory brought no peace-
not then, not since. One the contrary, the unexpected 
success only stimulated its defeated enemies as well as 
Israel to try to husband better their superior military 
resources with a view to another round and another, and 
thus signaled the beginning of a confrontation that has 
still not ceased, more than four decades later. 
Israel perceives some specific threats to its 
security. The unsettled borders; the threat from 
Palestinian Fedyeen; the emergent chemical weapons 
programme in the Arab World, notably Iraq and Libya and the 
growing Islamic fundamentalism in the region. Israel tried 
to tackle the border problems of expanding its frontiers and 
creating new Jewish settlements along the border. 
Israel today has military superiority, chemical and 
nuclear capability, long range missiles, sophisticated 
aircrafts, reconnaissance satellite, submarines and enjoys a 
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commanding strategic position with natural defence aid such 
as physical barriers (mountains, rivers,- internal strategic 
depth to absorb and attack). It receives more than $3 
billion a year in U.S. aid plus retains her strategic 
alliance and special relationship with the U.S. 
The Fate of Israel is linked to the national 
security interests of the U.S. The U.S. continues to have 
sustained interests in Israel as a front line state and 
strategic base in Middle East. This U.S. interest is a 
product of a variety of factors that can include a Jewish 
interest group pressure in domestic politics; the desire to 
use a non- Islamic ally in a predominantly Islamic World; a 
politically stable ally who has commonality of world views; 
etc. Israel, on the other hand, is likely to realize the 
limitations of this dependency relationship. Israel's 
efforts at expressing its independent identity and forgoing 
a policy of relatively aggressive and self-reliant (and 
defiant) security posture is a telling example of this 
trend. One suspects that if at all the U.S. is forced to 
put pressure on Israel for concessions in the Middle East 
Peace process, Israel would insure that it extracts a price 
from the U.S. 
U.S.- Israeli Military connections are very old since 
the birth of State of Israel but large amount of arms 
transfer to Israel seen in the context of Arab- Israeli 
184 
conflict and its implications for U.S. objective in the 
region. Disappointed by the radical attitude of the Arabs 
and Soviet expansion in the region, America started arms 
supply to Israel to a large extent. A $ 25 million deal was 
completed which included the Hawk minnilon. AfLci: Lhio 
United States further supplies A-4 Skyhawks. After the June 
1967 War, United States again started arms supply to Israel 
in response of the Soviet arms supply to Egypt and Syria. 
In 1968, on the request of Israel, Johnson administration 
agreed for the sale of 50 Phantom Jets and 25 additional 
Skyhawks to Israel. On the event of the 'War of attribu-
tion' . President Nixon said that United States was prepared 
to supply military equipment to friendly country like Israel 
for the safety of her people. 
The successive governments in United States became 
very much keen on the survival and security of Israel. This 
was done through arming that country considerably and this 
has continued to be the main plank of her foreign policy. 
U.S. supported Israel on almost all the issues in and out 
United Nations, of crucial interest to the Jewish State. 
Post 1973 period witnessed massive arms race in the West 
Asia vis-a-vis U.S. arms supply to Israel. United States 
supplied arms to Israel even when there was no treaty about 
arms transfer between the two countries. Finally amend-
ment in Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 finished the 
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legal hinderence on arms sale and thus cleared the way for 
the massive U.S. arms supply to Israel. The rapid growth 
in American assistance to Israel can be seen that after the 
first three years of 1967 War. It was $40 million a year 
and in the next three years it averaged about $ 400 million 
nearly 28 per cent of her total defence expenditure and in 
1974- 75 it averaged about $1.5 billion raising it to 42 per 
cent of her defence spendings. In May 1986 Israel joined 
the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) Programme with 
its potential for applying ATBM technology to countering the 
SSM challenge to Israel. The Congress of United States 
also approved $180 million for Israel to develop a defensive 
system against short range missiles and thus making for the 
country's entry into what is popularly known as star war 
programme. The financial aid of U.S. has been essential for 
Israel's survival and development. By 1986 Israel had 
received more than $ 30 billion in grants and loans from 
the U.S. since 1948. 
The U.S. has emerged as a key arbitrator in the 
future of Middle East Politics and a single most powerful 
influence, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. 
The U.S. ascendancy can be treated to the Camp David break-
through of 1978. It has been demonstrated in the successful 
completion of Egypt-Israel treaty. In the post Kuwait phase 
the U.S. has further strengthened its position in the region. 
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Thus peace in the Middle East at this juncture of history 
cannot and will not be achieved without the active involve-
ment of the U.S. 
These facts shows that Israel could not exist 
without external aid especially the considerable volum it 
receives from the U.S. Thus the fate of Israel is linked 
to the National Security Interests of the U.S. and the 
U.S. has repeatedly clear its commitment to the security of 
Israel. The U.S. is always determined to help Israel to 
have an edge on its neighbours. One can say that from a 
conceptual, historical, political and psychological point of 
view, the relationship between U.S. and Israel is sound, 
founded on reciprocity and common interest. 
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